{"id":123157,"date":"2021-06-21T10:38:30","date_gmt":"2021-06-21T17:38:30","guid":{"rendered":"http:\/\/69.46.6.243\/?p=123157"},"modified":"2021-06-21T10:38:30","modified_gmt":"2021-06-21T17:38:30","slug":"supreme-court-sides-with-students-9-0-over-ncaa-on-compensation-to-student-athletes","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/new.thepinetree.net\/?p=123157","title":{"rendered":"Supreme Court Sides with Students 9-0 over NCAA on Compensation to Student Athletes"},"content":{"rendered":"

Washington, DC…In many cases such as this we believe the best way we can provide accurate news is let the newsmakers speak for themselves. This case is no different as the Supreme Court’s Opinion is better than any summary we could provide. Justice Gorsuch delivered the opinion of the Court and it follows. Click the image below for the complete decision in PDF format. 20-512_gfbh<\/a><\/p>\n

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The Roberts Court, April 23, 2021 Seated from left to right: Justices Samuel A. Alito, Jr. and Clarence Thomas, Chief Justice John G. Roberts, Jr., and Justices Stephen G. Breyer and Sonia Sotomayor Standing from left to right: Justices Brett M. Kavanaugh, Elena Kagan, Neil M. Gorsuch, and Amy Coney Barrett. Photograph by Fred Schilling, Collection of the Supreme Court of the United States<\/p>\n

“In the Sherman Act, Congress tasked courts with enforcing a policy of competition on the belief that market forces\u201cyield the best allocation\u201d of the Nation\u2019s resources. National Collegiate Athletic Assn. v. Board of Regents of Univ. of Okla., 468 U. S. 85, 104, n. 27 (1984). The plaintiffs before us brought this lawsuit alleging that the National Collegiate Athletic Association (NCAA) and certain of its member institutions violated this policy by agreeing to restrict the compensation colleges and universities may offer the student-athletes who play for their teams. After amassinga vast record and conducting an exhaustive trial, the district court issued a 50-page opinion that cut both ways. The court refused to disturb the NCAA\u2019s rules limiting undergraduate athletic scholarships and other compensation related to athletic performance. At the same time, the court struck down NCAA rules limiting the education-related benefits schools may offer student-athletes\u2014such as rules that prohibit schools from offering graduate or vocational school scholarships. Before us, the student-athletes do not challenge the district court\u2019s judgment. But the NCAA does. In essence, it seeks immunity from the normal operation of the antitrust laws and argues, in any event, that the district court should have approved all of its existing restraints. We took this case to consider those objections.<\/p>\n

From the start, American colleges and universities have had a complicated relationship with sports and money. In 1852, students from Harvard and Yale participated in what many regard as the Nation\u2019s first intercollegiate competition\u2014a boat race at Lake Winnipesaukee, New Hampshire. But this was no pickup match. A railroad executive sponsored the event to promote train travel to the picturesque lake. T. Mendenhall, The Harvard-Yale Boat Race 1852\u2013 1924, pp. 15\u201316 (1993). He offered the competitors an all expenses-paid vacation with lavish prizes\u2014along with unlimited alcohol. See A. Zimbalist, Unpaid Professionals 6\u20137 (1999) (Zimbalist); Rushin, Inside the Moat, Sports Illustrated, Mar. 3, 1997. The event filled the resort with \u201clife and excitement,\u201d N. Y. Herald, Aug. 10, 1852, p. 2, col. 2,and one student-athlete described the \u201c\u2018junket\u2019\u201d as an experience \u201c\u2018as unique and irreproducible as the Rhodian colossus,\u2019\u201d Mendenhall, Harvard-Yale Boat Race, at 20.<\/p>\n

Life might be no \u201cless than a boat race,\u201d Holmes, On Receiving the Degree of Doctor of Laws, Yale University Commencement, June 30, 1886, in Speeches by Oliver Wendall Holmes, p. 27 (1918), but it was football that really caused college sports to take off. \u201cBy the late 1880s the traditional rivalry between Princeton and Yale was attracting 40,000 spectators and generating in excess of $25,000 . . . in gaterevenues.\u201d Zimbalist 7. Schools regularly had \u201cgraduate students and paid ringers\u201d on their teams. Ibid.<\/p>\n

Colleges offered all manner of compensation to talented athletes. Yale reportedly lured a tackle named James Hogan with free meals and tuition, a trip to Cuba, the exclusive right to sell scorecards from his games\u2014and a job as acigarette agent for the American Tobacco Company. Ibid.; see also Needham, The College Athlete, McClure\u2019s Magazine, June 1905, p. 124. The absence of academic residency requirements gave rise to \u201c\u2018tramp athletes\u2019\u201d who \u201croamed the country making cameo athletic appearances, moving onwhenever and wherever the money was better.\u201d F. Dealy, Win at Any Cost 71 (1990). One famous example was a law student at West Virginia University\u2014Fielding H. Yost\u2014\u201cwho, in 1896, transferred to Lafayette as a freshman just in time to lead his new teammates to victory against its arch-rival, Penn.\u201d Ibid. The next week, he \u201cwas back at West Virginia\u2019s law school.\u201d Ibid. College sports became such a big business that Woodrow Wilson, then President of Princeton University, quipped to alumni in 1890 that \u201c\u2018Princeton is noted in this wide world for three things: football, baseball, and collegiate instruction.\u2019\u201d Zimbalist 7.<\/p>\n

By 1905, though, a crisis emerged. While college footballwas hugely popular, it was extremely violent. Plays like the flying wedge and the players\u2019 light protective gear led to 7football fatalities in 1893, 12 deaths the next year, and 18 in 1905. Id., at 8. President Theodore Roosevelt responded by convening a meeting between Harvard, Princeton, andYale to review the rules of the game, a gathering that ultimately led to the creation of what we now know as the NCAA. Ibid. Organized primarily as a standard-settingbody, the association also expressed a view at its founding about compensating college athletes\u2014admonishing that\u201c[n]o student shall represent a College or University in any intercollegiate game or contest who is paid or receives, directly or indirectly, any money, or financial concession.\u201d Intercollegiate Athletic Association of the United States Constitution By-Laws, Art. VII, \u00a73 (1906); see also Proceedingsof the Eleventh Annual Convention of the National Collegiate Athletic Association, Dec. 28, 1916, p. 34.<\/p>\n

Reality did not always match aspiration. More than two decades later, the Carnegie Foundation produced a reporton college athletics that found them still \u201csodden with the commercial and the material and the vested interests that these forces have created.\u201d H. Savage, The Carnegie Foundation for the Advancement of Teaching, American College Athletics Bull. 23, p. 310 (1929). Schools across the country sought to leverage sports to bring in revenue, attract attention, boost enrollment, and raise money from alumni. The University of California\u2019s athletic revenue was over$480,000, while Harvard\u2019s football revenue alone came in at $429,000. Id., at 87. College football was \u201cnot a student\u2019sgame\u201d; it was an \u201corganized commercial enterprise\u201d featuring athletes with \u201cyears of training,\u201d \u201cprofessional coaches,\u201d and competitions that were \u201chighly profitable.\u201d Id., at viii.<\/p>\n

The commercialism extended to the market for student-athletes. Seeking the best players, many schools actively participated in a system \u201cunder which boys are offered pecuniary and other inducements to enter a particular college.\u201d Id., at xiv\u2013xv. One coach estimated that a rival team \u201cspent over $200,000 a year on players.\u201d Zimbalist 9. In 1939, freshmen at the University of Pittsburgh went onstrike because upperclassmen were reportedly earning more money. Crabb, The Amateurism Myth: A Case for aNew Tradition, 28 Stan. L. & Pol\u2019y Rev. 181, 190 (2017). In the 1940s, Hugh McElhenny, a halfback at the University of Washington, \u201cbecame known as the first college player \u2018ever to take a cut in salary to play pro football.\u2019\u201d Zimbalist 22\u201323. He reportedly said: \u201c\u2018[A] wealthy guy puts big bucks under my pillow every time I score a touchdown. Hell, I can\u2019t afford to graduate.\u2019\u201d Id., at 211, n. 17. In 1946, a commentator offered this view: \u201c[W]hen it comes to chicanery, double-dealing, and general undercover work behind the scenes, big-time college football is in a class by itself.\u201d Woodward, Is College Football on the Level?, Sport, Nov. 1946, Vol. 1, No. 3, p. 35.<\/p>\n

In 1948, the NCAA sought to do more than admonish. It adopted the \u201cSanity Code.\u201d Colleges Adopt the \u2018Sanity Code\u2019 To Govern Sports, N. Y. Times, Jan. 11, 1948, p. 1,col. 1. The code reiterated the NCAA\u2019s opposition to \u201cpromised pay in any form.\u201d Hearings before the Subcommittee on Oversight and Investigations of the House Committee on Interstate and Foreign Commerce, 95th Congress, 2d Sess.,pt. 2, p. 1094 (1978). But for the first time the code also authorized colleges and universities to pay athletes\u2019 tuition. Ibid. And it created a new enforcement mechanism\u2014 providing for the \u201csuspension or expulsion\u201d of \u201cproven offenders.\u201d Colleges Adopt \u2018Sanity Code,\u2019 N. Y. Times, p. 1, col. 1. To some, these changes sought to substitute a consistent, above-board compensation system for the varying under-the-table schemes that had long proliferated. To others, the code marked \u201cthe beginning of the NCAA behaving as an effective cartel,\u201d by enabling its member schools to set and enforce \u201crules that limit the price they have to pay fortheir inputs (mainly the \u2018student-athletes\u2019).\u201d Zimbalist 10.<\/p>\n

The rules regarding student-athlete compensation haveevolved ever since. In 1956, the NCAA expanded the scopeof allowable payments to include room, board, books, fees, and \u201ccash for incidental expenses such as laundry.\u201d In re National Collegiate Athletic Assn. Athletic Grant-in-Aid Cap Antitrust Litig., 375 F. Supp. 3d 1058, 1063 (ND Cal.2019) (hereinafter D. Ct. Op.). In 1974, the NCAA beganpermitting paid professionals in one sport to compete on anamateur basis in another. Brief for Historians as Amici Cu6riae 10. In 2014, the NCAA \u201cannounced it would allow athletic conferences to authorize their member schools to increase scholarships up to the full cost of attendance.\u201d O\u2019Bannon v. National Collegiate Athletic Assn., 802 F. 3d 1049, 1054\u20131055 (CA9 2015). The 80 member schools of the \u201cPower Five\u201d athletic conferences\u2014the conferences with the highest revenue in Division I\u2014promptly voted to raise their scholarship limits to an amount that is generally several thousand dollars higher than previous limits. D. Ct. Op., at 1064.<\/p>\n

In recent years, changes have continued. The NCAA has created the \u201cStudent Assistance Fund\u201d and the \u201cAcademic Enhancement Fund\u201d to \u201cassist student-athletes in meeting financial needs,\u201d \u201cimprove their welfare or academic support,\u201d or \u201crecognize academic achievement.\u201d Id., at 1072. These funds have supplied money to student-athletes for \u201cpostgraduate scholarships\u201d and \u201cschool supplies,\u201d as well as \u201cbenefits that are not related to education,\u201d such as \u201clossof-value insurance premiums,\u201d \u201ctravel expenses,\u201d \u201cclothing,\u201d and \u201cmagazine subscriptions.\u201d Id., at 1072, n. 15. In 2018, the NCAA made more than $84 million available through the Student Activities Fund and more than $48 million available through the Academic Enhancement Fund. Id., at 1072. Assistance may be provided in cash or in kind, and there is no limit to the amount any particularstudent-athlete may receive. Id., at 1073. Since 2015, disbursements to individual students have sometimes been tens of thousands of dollars above the full cost of attendance. Ibid.<\/p>\n

The NCAA has also allowed payments \u201c\u2018incidental to athletics participation,\u2019\u201d including awards for \u201cparticipation orachievement in athletics\u201d (like \u201cqualifying for a bowl game\u201d)and certain \u201cpayments from outside entities\u201d (such as for\u201cperformance in the Olympics\u201d). Id., at 1064, 1071, 1074. The NCAA permits its member schools to award up to (but no more than) two annual \u201cSenior Scholar Awards\u201d of
\n7
\nCite as: 594 U. S. ____ (2021)
\nOpinion of the Court
\n$10,000 for students to attend graduate school after their athletic eligibility expires. Id., at 1074. Finally, the NCAAallows schools to fund travel for student-athletes\u2019 family members to attend \u201ccertain events.\u201d Id., at 1069.
\nOver the decades, the NCAA has become a sprawling enterprise. Its membership comprises about 1,100 colleges and universities, organized into three divisions. Id., at 1063. Division I teams are often the most popular and attract the most money and the most talented athletes. Currently, Division I includes roughly 350 schools divided across 32 conferences. See ibid. Within Division I, the most popular sports are basketball and football. The NCAA divides Division I football into the Football Bowl Subdivision (FBS) and the Football Championship Subdivision, with the FBS generally featuring the best teams. Ibid. The 32 conferences in Division I function similarly to the NCAA itself,but on a smaller scale. They \u201ccan and do enact their own rules.\u201d Id., at 1090.<\/p>\n

At the center of this thicket of associations and rules sits a massive business. The NCAA\u2019s current broadcast contract for the March Madness basketball tournament is worth $1.1 billion annually. See id., at 1077, n. 20. Its television deal for the FBS conference\u2019s College Football Playoff is worth approximately $470 million per year. See id., at 1063; Bachman, ESPN Strikes Deal for College Football Playoff, Wall Street Journal, Nov. 21, 2012. Beyondthese sums, the Division I conferences earn substantial revenue from regular-season games. For example, the Southeastern Conference (SEC) \u201cmade more than $409 million inrevenues from television contracts alone in 2017, with its total conference revenues exceeding $650 million that year.\u201d D. Ct. Op., at 1063. All these amounts have \u201cincreased consistently over the years.\u201d Ibid.<\/p>\n

Those who run this enterprise profit in a different way than the student-athletes whose activities they oversee.The president of the NCAA earns nearly $4 million per year. Brief for Players Association of the National Football League et al. as Amici Curiae 17. Commissioners of the top conferences take home between $2 to $5 million. Ibid. College athletic directors average more than $1 million annually. Ibid. And annual salaries for top Division I college football coaches approach $11 million, with some of their assistants making more than $2.5 million. Id., at 17\u201318.<\/p>\n

B The plaintiffs are current and former student-athletes in men\u2019s Division I FBS football and men\u2019s and women\u2019s Division I basketball. They filed a class action against the NCAA and 11 Division I conferences (for simplicity\u2019s sake, we refer to the defendants collectively as the NCAA). The student-athletes challenged the \u201ccurrent, interconnectedset of NCAA rules that limit the compensation they mayreceive in exchange for their athletic services.\u201d D. Ct. Op.,at 1062, 1065, n. 5. Specifically, they alleged that theNCAA\u2019s rules violate \u00a71 of the Sherman Act, which prohibits \u201ccontract[s], combination[s], or conspirac[ies] in restraint of trade or commerce.\u201d 15 U. S. C. \u00a71.After pretrial proceedings stretching years, the districtcourt conducted a 10-day bench trial. It heard experts and lay witnesses from both sides, and received volumes of evidence and briefing, all before issuing an exhaustive decision. In the end, the court found the evidence undisputedon certain points. The NCAA did not \u201ccontest evidence showing\u201d that it and its members have agreed to compensation limits on student-athletes; the NCAA and its conferences enforce these limits by punishing violations; and these limits \u201caffect interstate commerce.\u201d D. Ct. Op., at 1066. Based on these premises, the district court proceeded to assess the lawfulness of the NCAA\u2019s challenged restraints. This Court has \u201clong recognized that in view of the common law and the law in this country when the Sherman Act was passed, the phrase \u2018restraint of trade\u2019 is best read to mean\u2018undue restraint.\u2019\u201d Ohio v. American Express Co., 585 U. S. ___, ___ (2018) (slip op., at 8) (brackets and some internal quotation marks omitted). Determining whether a restraint is undue for purposes of the Sherman Act \u201cpresumptively\u201d calls for what we have described as a \u201crule of reasonanalysis.\u201d Texaco Inc. v. Dagher, 547 U. S. 1, 5 (2006); Standard Oil Co. of N. J. v. United States, 221 U. S. 1, 60\u2013 62 (1911). That manner of analysis generally requires a court to \u201cconduct a fact-specific assessment of market power and market structure\u201d to assess a challenged restraint\u2019s \u201cactual effect on competition.\u201d American Express, 585 U. S., at ___\u2013___ (slip op., at 8\u20139) (internal quotation marks omitted). Always, \u201c[t]he goal is to distinguish between restraints with anticompetitive effect that are harmful to theconsumer and restraints stimulating competition that arein the consumer\u2019s best interest.\u201d Ibid. (brackets and internal quotation marks omitted).<\/p>\n

In applying the rule of reason, the district court began byobserving that the NCAA enjoys \u201cnear complete dominanceof, and exercise[s] monopsony power in, the relevant market\u201d\u2014which it defined as the market for \u201cathletic services in men\u2019s and women\u2019s Division I basketball and FBS football, wherein each class member participates in his or hersport-specific market.\u201d D. Ct. Op., at 1097. The \u201cmost talented athletes are concentrated\u201d in the \u201cmarkets for Division I basketball and FBS football.\u201d Id., at 1067. There are no \u201cviable substitutes,\u201d as the \u201cNCAA\u2019s Division I essentially is the relevant market for elite college football and basketball.\u201d Id., at 1067, 1070. In short, the NCAA and its member schools have the \u201cpower to restrain student-athletecompensation in any way and at any time they wish, without any meaningful risk of diminishing their market dominance.\u201d Id., at 1070.<\/p>\n

The district court then proceeded to find that the NCAA\u2019scompensation limits \u201cproduce significant anticompetitive
\neffects in the relevant market.\u201d Id., at 1067. Though member schools compete fiercely in recruiting student-athletes, the NCAA uses its monopsony power to \u201ccap artificially the compensation offered to recruits.\u201d Id., at 1097. In a market without the challenged restraints, the district court found,\u201ccompetition among schools would increase in terms of thecompensation they would offer to recruits, and student-athlete compensation would be higher as a result.\u201d Id., at 1068. \u201cStudent-athletes would receive offers that would more closely match the value of their athletic services.\u201d Ibid. And notably, the court observed, the NCAA \u201cdid notmeaningfully dispute\u201d any of this evidence. Id., at 1067; see also Tr. of Oral Arg. 31 (\u201c[T]here\u2019s no dispute that the\u2014the no-pay-for-play rule imposes a significant restraint on a relevant antitrust market\u201d).<\/p>\n

The district court next considered the NCAA\u2019s procompetitive justifications for its restraints. The NCAA suggestedthat its restrictions help increase output in college sports and maintain a competitive balance among teams. But the district court rejected those justifications, D. Ct. Op., at 1070, n. 12, and the NCAA does not pursue them here. The NCAA\u2019s only remaining defense was that its rules preserve amateurism, which in turn widens consumer choice byproviding a unique product\u2014amateur college sports as distinct from professional sports. Admittedly, this assertedbenefit accrues to consumers in the NCAA\u2019s seller-side consumer market rather than to student-athletes whose compensation the NCAA fixes in its buyer-side labor market. But, the NCAA argued, the district court needed to assess its restraints in the labor market in light of their procompetitive benefits in the consumer market\u2014and the districtcourt agreed to do so. Id., at 1098.<\/p>\n

Turning to that task, the court observed that the NCAA\u2019sconception of amateurism has changed steadily over the years. See id., at 1063\u20131064, 1072\u20131073; see also supra, at 3\u20137. The court noted that the NCAA \u201cnowhere define[s] the nature of the amateurism they claim consumers insist upon.\u201d D. Ct. Op., at 1070. And, given all this, the court struggled to ascertain for itself \u201cany coherent definition\u201d of the term, id., at 1074, noting the testimony of a former SEC commissioner that he\u2019s \u201c\u2018never been clear on . . . what is really meant by amateurism.\u2019\u201d Id., at 1070\u20131071.<\/p>\n

Nor did the district court find much evidence to supportthe NCAA\u2019s contention that its compensation restrictionsplay a role in consumer demand. As the court put it, theevidence failed \u201cto establish that the challenged compensation rules, in and of themselves, have any direct connectionto consumer demand.\u201d Id., at 1070. The court observed, for example, that the NCAA\u2019s \u201conly economics expert on the issue of consumer demand\u201d did not \u201cstudy any standard measures of consumer demand\u201d but instead simply \u201cinterviewed people connected with the NCAA and its schools, who were chosen for him by defense counsel.\u201d Id., at 1075. Meanwhile, the student-athletes presented expert testimony and other evidence showing that consumer demand has increased markedly despite the new types of compensation the NCAA has allowed in recent decades. Id., at 1074, 1076. The plaintiffs presented economic and other evidencesuggesting as well that further increases in student-athlete compensation would \u201cnot negatively affect consumer demand.\u201d Id., at 1076. At the same time, however, the district court did find that one particular aspect of the NCAA\u2019s compensation limits \u201cmay have some effect in preserving consumer demand.\u201d Id., at 1082. Specifically, the court found that rules aimed at ensuring \u201cstudent-athletes do not receive unlimited payments unrelated to education\u201d could play some role in product differentiation with professional sports and thus help sustain consumer demand for college athletics. Id., at 1083.<\/p>\n

The court next required the student-athletes to show that\u201csubstantially less restrictive alternative rules\u201d existed that \u201cwould achieve the same procompetitive effect as the challenged set of rules.\u201d Id., at 1104. The district court emphasized that the NCAA must have \u201cample latitude\u201d to run its enterprise and that courts \u201cmay not use antitrust laws to make marginal adjustments to broadly reasonablemarket restraints.\u201d Ibid. (internal quotation marks omitted). In light of these standards, the court found the student-athletes had met their burden in some respects but not others. The court rejected the student-athletes\u2019 challenge to NCAA rules that limit athletic scholarships to thefull cost of attendance and that restrict compensation and benefits unrelated to education. These may be price-fixingagreements, but the court found them to be reasonable inlight of the possibility that \u201cprofessional-level cash payments . . . could blur the distinction between college sports and professional sports and thereby negatively affect consumer demand.\u201d Ibid.<\/p>\n

The court reached a different conclusion for caps on education-related benefits\u2014such as rules that limit scholarships for graduate or vocational school, payments for academic tutoring, or paid posteligibility internships. Id., at 1088. On no account, the court found, could such education-related benefits be \u201cconfused with a professional athlete\u2019s salary.\u201d Id., at 1083. If anything, they \u201cemphasize that the recipients are students.\u201d Ibid. Enjoining the NCAA\u2019s restrictions on these forms of compensation alone, the courtconcluded, would be substantially less restrictive than the NCAA\u2019s current rules and yet fully capable of preservingconsumer demand for college sports. Id., at 1088.<\/p>\n

The court then entered an injunction reflecting its findings and conclusions. Nothing in the order precluded the NCAA from continuing to fix compensation and benefits unrelated to education; limits on athletic scholarships, for example, remained untouched. The court enjoined the NCAAonly from limiting education-related compensation or benefits that conferences and schools may provide to student-athletes playing Division I football and basketball. App. to Pet. for Cert. in No. 20\u2013512, p. 167a, \u00b61. The court\u2019s injunction further specified that the NCAA could continue to limitcash awards for academic achievement\u2014but only so long as those limits are no lower than the cash awards allowed for athletic achievement (currently $5,980 annually). Id., at 168a\u2013169a, \u00b65; Order Granting Motion for Clarification of Injunction in No. 4:14\u2013md\u201302541, ECF Doc. 1329, pp. 5\u20136 (ND Cal., Dec. 30, 2020). The court added that the NCAA and its members were free to propose a definition of compensation or benefits \u201c\u2018related to education.\u2019\u201d App. to Pet. for Cert. in No. 20\u2013512, at 168a, \u00b64. And the court explained that the NCAA was free to regulate how conferences and schools provide education-related compensationand benefits. Ibid. The court further emphasized that itsinjunction applied only to the NCAA and multi-conference agreements\u2014thus allowing individual conferences (and theschools that constitute them) to impose tighter restrictionsif they wish. Id., at 169a, \u00b66. The district court\u2019s injunctionissued in March 2019, and took effect in August 2020.<\/p>\n

Both sides appealed. The student-athletes said the district court did not go far enough; it should have enjoined all of the NCAA\u2019s challenged compensation limits, includingthose \u201cuntethered to education,\u201d like its restrictions on the size of athletic scholarships and cash awards. In re National Collegiate Athletic Assn. Athletic Grant-in-Aid Cap Antitrust Litig., 958 F. 3d 1239, 1263 (CA9 2020). The NCAA, meanwhile, argued that the district court went too far by weakening its restraints on education-related compensation and benefits. In the end, the court of appeals affirmed in full, explaining its view that \u201cthe district courtstruck the right balance in crafting a remedy that both prevents anticompetitive harm to Student-Athletes while serving the procompetitive purpose of preserving the popularity of college sports.\u201d Ibid.<\/p>\n

C Unsatisfied with this result, the NCAA asks us to reverse to the extent the lower courts sided with the student-athletes. For their part, the student-athletes do not renew their across-the-board challenge to the NCAA\u2019s compensation restrictions. Accordingly, we do not pass on the rulesthat remain in place or the district court\u2019s judgment upholding them. Our review is confined to those restrictions now enjoined.Before us, as through much of the litigation below, some of the issues most frequently debated in antitrust litigation are uncontested. The parties do not challenge the district court\u2019s definition of the relevant market. They do not contest that the NCAA enjoys monopoly (or, as it\u2019s called on thebuyer side, monopsony) control in that labor market\u2014such that it is capable of depressing wages below competitive levels and restricting the quantity of student-athlete labor.Nor does the NCAA dispute that its member schools compete fiercely for student-athletes but remain subject to NCAA-issued-and-enforced limits on what compensationthey can offer. Put simply, this suit involves admitted horizontal price fixing in a market where the defendants exercise monopoly control.Other significant matters are taken as given here too. No one disputes that the NCAA\u2019s restrictions in fact decrease the compensation that student-athletes receive compared to what a competitive market would yield. No one questionseither that decreases in compensation also depress participation by student-athletes in the relevant labor market\u2014so that price and quantity are both suppressed. See 12 P. Areeda & H. Hovenkamp, Antitrust Law \u00b62011b, p. 134 (4th ed. 2019) (Areeda & Hovenkamp). Nor does the NCAA suggest that, to prevail, the plaintiff student-athletes mustshow that its restraints harm competition in the seller-side (or consumer facing) market as well as in its buyer-side (or labor) market. See, e.g., Mandeville Island Farms, Inc. v. American Crystal Sugar Co., 334 U. S. 219, 235 (1948); Weyerhaeuser Co. v. Ross-Simmons Hardwood Lumber Co., 549 U. S. 312, 321 (2007); 2A Areeda & Hovenkamp \u00b6352c,pp. 288\u2013289 (2014); 12 id., \u00b62011a, at 132\u2013134.<\/p>\n

Meanwhile, the student-athletes do not question that theNCAA may permissibly seek to justify its restraints in the labor market by pointing to procompetitive effects they produce in the consumer market. Some amici argue that \u201ccompetition in input markets is incommensurable with competition in output markets,\u201d and that a court should not \u201ctradeoff \u201d sacrificing a legally cognizable interest in competitionin one market to better promote competition in a different one; review should instead be limited to the particular market in which antitrust plaintiffs have asserted their injury.Brief for American Antitrust Institute as Amicus Curiae 3, 11\u201312. But the parties before us do not pursue this line.<\/p>\n

With all these matters taken as given, we express no views on them. Instead, we focus only on the objections the NCAA does raise. Principally, it suggests that the lower courts erred by subjecting its compensation restrictions toa rule of reason analysis. In the NCAA\u2019s view, the courts should have given its restrictions at most an \u201cabbreviated deferential review,\u201d Brief for Petitioner in No. 20\u2013512,
\np.
\n14, or a \u201c\u2018quick look,\u2019\u201d Brief for Petitioners in No. 20\u2013520,
\np.
\n18, before approving them.
\nThe NCAA offers a few reasons why. Perhaps dominantly, it argues that it is a joint venture and that collaboration among its members is necessary if they are to offer consumers the benefit of intercollegiate athletic competition. We doubt little of this. There\u2019s no question, for example, that many \u201cjoint ventures are calculated to enable firms to do something more cheaply or better than they did it before.\u201d 13 Areeda & Hovenkamp \u00b62100c, at 7. And the fact that joint ventures can have such procompetitive benefitssurely stands as a caution against condemning their arrangements too reflexively. See Dagher, 547 U. S., at 7; Broadcast Music, Inc. v. Columbia Broadcasting System, Inc., 441 U. S. 1, 22\u201323 (1979).<\/p>\n

But even assuming (without deciding) that the NCAA isa joint venture, that does not guarantee the foreshortened review it seeks. Most restraints challenged under the Sherman Act\u2014including most joint venture restrictions\u2014are subject to the rule of reason, which (again) we have described as \u201ca fact-specific assessment of market power andmarket structure\u201d aimed at assessing the challenged restraint\u2019s \u201cactual effect on competition\u201d\u2014especially its capacity to reduce output and increase price. American Express, 585 U. S., at ___\u2013___ (slip op., at 8\u20139) (internalquotation marks omitted).
\nAdmittedly, the amount of work needed to conduct a fairassessment of these questions can vary. As the NCAA observes, this Court has suggested that sometimes we can determine the competitive effects of a challenged restraint in the \u201c\u2018twinkling of an eye.\u2019\u201d Board of Regents, 468 U. S., at 110, n. 39 (quoting P. Areeda, The \u201cRule of Reason\u201d in Antitrust Analysis: General Issues 37\u201338 (Federal JudicialCenter, June 1981)); American Needle, Inc. v. National Football League, 560 U. S. 183, 203 (2010). That is true, though, only for restraints at opposite ends of the competitive spectrum. For those sorts of restraints\u2014rather than restraints in the great in-between\u2014a quick look is sufficient for approval or condemnation.
\nAt one end of the spectrum, some restraints may be so obviously incapable of harming competition that they require little scrutiny. In Rothery Storage & Van Co. v. Atlas Van Lines, Inc., 792 F. 2d 210 (CADC 1986), for example, Judge Bork explained that the analysis could begin and end with the observation that the joint venture under review\u201ccommand[ed] between 5.1 and 6% of the relevant market.\u201d<\/p>\n

Id., at 217. Usually, joint ventures enjoying such smallmarket share are incapable of impairing competition. Should they reduce their output, \u201cthere would be no effect upon market price because firms making up the other 94% of the market would simply take over the abandoned business.\u201d Ibid.; see also 7 Areeda & Hovenkamp \u00b61507a,
\np. 444 (2017) (If \u201cthe exercise of market power is not plausible, the challenged practice is legal\u201d); Polk Bros., Inc. v. Forest City Enterprises, Inc., 776 F. 2d 185, 191 (CA7 1985) (\u201cUnless the firms have the power to raise price by curtailing output, their agreement is unlikely to harm consumers,and it makes sense to understand their cooperation as benign or beneficial\u201d).<\/p>\n

At the other end, some agreements among competitors so obviously threaten to reduce output and raise prices thatthey might be condemned as unlawful per se or rejected after only a quick look. See Dagher, 547 U. S., at 7, n. 3; California Dental Assn. v. FTC, 526 U. S. 756, 770 (1999). Recognizing the inherent limits on a court\u2019s ability to masteran entire industry\u2014and aware that there are often hard-tosee efficiencies attendant to complex business arrangements\u2014we take special care not to deploy these condemnatory tools until we have amassed \u201cconsiderable experiencewith the type of restraint at issue\u201d and \u201ccan predict withconfidence that it would be invalidated in all or almost all instances.\u201d Leegin Creative Leather Products, Inc. v. PSKS, Inc., 551 U. S. 877, 886\u2013887 (2007); Easterbrook, On Identifying Exclusionary Conduct, 61 Notre Dame L. Rev. 972, 975 (1986) (noting that it can take \u201ceconomists years, sometimes decades, to understand why certain business practices work [and] determine whether they work because of increased efficiency or exclusion\u201d); see also infra, at 26\u201327 (further reasons for caution).
\nNone of this helps the NCAA. The NCAA accepts that its members collectively enjoy monopsony power in the market for student-athlete services, such that its restraints can
\n18 NATIONAL COLLEGIATE ATHLETIC ASSN. v. ALSTON
\nOpinion of the Court
\n(and in fact do) harm competition. See D. Ct. Op., at 1067. Unlike customers who would look elsewhere when a small van company raises its prices above market levels, the district court found (and the NCAA does not here contest) thatstudent-athletes have nowhere else to sell their labor. Even if the NCAA is a joint venture, then, it is hardly of the sort that would warrant quick-look approval for all its myriad rules and restrictions.
\nNor does the NCAA\u2019s status as a particular type of venture categorically exempt its restraints from ordinary rule of reason review. We do not doubt that some degree of coordination between competitors within sports leagues can be procompetitive. Without some agreement among rivals\u2014on things like how many players may be on the fieldor the time allotted for play\u2014the very competitions that consumers value would not be possible. See Board of Regents, 468 U. S., at 101 (quoting R. Bork, The Antitrust Paradox 278 (1978)). Accordingly, even a sports league withmarket power might see some agreements among its members win antitrust approval in the \u201c\u2018twinkling of an eye.\u2019\u201d American Needle, 560 U. S., at 203.<\/p>\n

But this insight does not always apply. That some restraints are necessary to create or maintain a league sport does not mean all \u201caspects of elaborate interleague cooperation are.\u201d Id., at 199, n. 7. While a quick look will oftenbe enough to approve the restraints \u201cnecessary to producea game,\u201d ibid., a fuller review may be appropriate for others. See, e.g., Chicago Professional Sports Ltd. Partnership<\/p>\n

v. National Basketball Assn., 95 F. 3d 593, 600 (CA7 1996) (\u201cJust as the ability of McDonald\u2019s franchises to coordinatethe release of a new hamburger does not imply their ability to agree on wages for counter workers, so the ability of sports teams to agree on a TV contract need not imply anability to set wages for players\u201d).
\nThe NCAA\u2019s rules fixing wages for student-athletes fallon the far side of this line. Nobody questions that Division I basketball and FBS football can proceed (and have proceeded) without the education-related compensation restrictions the district court enjoined; the games go on. Instead, the parties dispute whether and to what extent thoserestrictions in the NCAA\u2019s labor market yield benefits in its consumer market that can be attained using substantially less restrictive means. That dispute presents complexquestions requiring more than a blink to answer.
\nB Even if background antitrust principles counsel in favor of the rule of reason, the NCAA replies that a particular precedent ties our hands. The NCAA directs our attention to Board of Regents, where this Court considered the league\u2019s rules restricting the ability of its member schoolsto televise football games. 468 U. S., at 94. On the NCAA\u2019s reading, that decision expressly approved its limits on student-athlete compensation\u2014and this approval foreclosesany meaningful review of those limits today.We see things differently. Board of Regents explainedthat the league\u2019s television rules amounted to \u201c[h]orizontalprice fixing and output limitation[s]\u201d of the sort that are\u201cordinarily condemned\u201d as \u201c\u2018illegal per se.\u2019\u201d Id., at 100. The Court declined to declare the NCAA\u2019s restraints per se unlawful only because they arose in \u201can industry\u201d in whichsome \u201chorizontal restraints on competition are essential if the product is to be available at all.\u201d Id., at 101\u2013102. Our analysis today is fully consistent with all of this. Indeed, if any daylight exists it is only in the NCAA\u2019s favor. While Board of Regents did not condemn the NCAA\u2019s broadcasting restraints as per se unlawful, it invoked abbreviated antitrust review as a path to condemnation, not salvation. Id., at 109, n. 39. If a quick look was thought sufficient beforerejecting the NCAA\u2019s procompetitive rationales in thatcase, it is hard to see how the NCAA might object to a court providing a more cautious form of review before reaching a similar judgment here.<\/p>\n

To be sure, the NCAA isn\u2019t without a reply. It notes that, in the course of reaching its judgment about television marketing restrictions, the Board of Regents Court commented on student-athlete compensation restrictions. Most
\nparticularly, the NCAA highlights this passage:<\/p>\n

\u201cThe NCAA plays a critical role in the maintenance of a revered tradition of amateurism in college sports.There can be no question but that it needs ample latitude to play that role, or that the preservation of thestudent-athlete in higher education adds richness anddiversity to intercollegiate athletics and is entirely consistent with the goals of the Sherman Act.\u201d Id., at 120.<\/p>\n

See also id., at 101, 102 (the NCAA \u201cseeks to market a particular brand of football\u201d in which \u201cathletes must not be paid, must be required to attend class, and the like\u201d). On the NCAA\u2019s telling, these observations foreclose any rule ofreason review in this suit.<\/p>\n

Once more, we cannot agree. Board of Regents may suggest that courts should take care when assessing theNCAA\u2019s restraints on student-athlete compensation, sensitive to their procompetitive possibilities. But these remarks do not suggest that courts must reflexively reject all challenges to the NCAA\u2019s compensation restrictions. Student-athlete compensation rules were not even at issue in Board of Regents. And the Court made clear it was onlyassuming the reasonableness of the NCAA\u2019s restrictions:\u201cIt is reasonable to assume that most of the regulatory controls of the NCAA are justifiable means of fostering competition among amateur athletic teams and are thereforeprocompetitive . . . .\u201d Id., at 117 (emphasis added). Accordingly, the Court simply did not have occasion to declare\u2014nor did it declare\u2014the NCAA\u2019s compensation restrictionsprocompetitive both in 1984 and forevermore.<\/p>\n

Our confidence on this score is fortified by still another factor. Whether an antitrust violation exists necessarilydepends on a careful analysis of market realities. See, e.g., American Express Co., 585 U. S., at ___\u2013___ (slip op., at 10\u201312); 2B Areeda & Hovenkamp \u00b6500, p. 107 (2014). If those market realities change, so may the legal analysis.<\/p>\n

When it comes to college sports, there can be little doubt that the market realities have changed significantly since 1984. Since then, the NCAA has dramatically increased the amounts and kinds of benefits schools may provide to student-athletes. For example, it has allowed the conferences flexibility to set new and higher limits on athletic scholarships. D. Ct. Op., at 1064. It has increased the size of permissible benefits \u201cincidental to athletics participation.\u201d Id., at 1066. And it has developed the Student Assistance Fund and the Academic Enhancement Fund, which in 2018 alone provided over $100 million to student-athletes. Id., at 1072. Nor is that all that has changed. In 1985, Division I football and basketball raised approximately $922 million and $41million respectively. Brief for Former NCAA Executives as Amici Curiae 7. By 2016, NCAA Division I schools raised more than $13.5 billion. Ibid. From 1982 to 1984, CBS paid$16 million per year to televise the March Madness DivisionI men\u2019s basketball tournament. Ibid. In 2016, those annual television rights brought in closer to $1.1 billion. D. Ct. Op.,at 1077, n. 20.<\/p>\n

Given the sensitivity of antitrust analysis to market realities\u2014and how much has changed in this market\u2014we think it would be particularly unwise to treat an aside in Board of Regents as more than that. This Court may be \u201cinfallible only because we are final,\u201d Brown v. Allen, 344<\/p>\n

U. S. 443, 540 (1953) (Jackson, J., concurring in result), but those sorts of stray comments are neither.
\nC The NCAA submits that a rule of reason analysis is inappropriate for still another reason\u2014because the NCAA and
\n22 NATIONAL COLLEGIATE ATHLETIC ASSN. v. ALSTON
\nOpinion of the Court
\nits member schools are not \u201ccommercial enterprises\u201d and instead oversee intercollegiate athletics \u201cas an integral partof the undergraduate experience.\u201d Brief for Petitioner in No. 20\u2013512, at 31. The NCAA represents that it seeks to\u201cmaintain amateurism in college sports as part of serving [the] societally important non-commercial objective\u201d of\u201chigher education.\u201d Id., at 3.<\/p>\n

Here again, however, there may be less of a dispute thanmeets the eye. The NCAA does not contest that its restraints affect interstate trade and commerce and are thus subject to the Sherman Act. See D. Ct. Op., at 1066. The NCAA acknowledges that this Court already analyzed (and struck down) some of its restraints as anticompetitive in Board of Regents. And it admits, as it must, that the Court did all this only after observing that the Sherman Act hadalready been applied to other nonprofit organizations\u2014and that \u201cthe economic significance of the NCAA\u2019s nonprofitcharacter is questionable at best\u201d given that \u201cthe NCAA andits member institutions are in fact organized to maximize revenues.\u201d 468 U. S., at 100\u2013101, n. 22. Nor, on the other side of the equation, does anyone contest that the status of the NCAA\u2019s members as schools and the status of student-athletes as students may be relevant in assessing consumer demand as part of a rule of reason review. With this much agreed it is unclear exactly what the NCAA seeks. To the extent it means to propose a sort ofjudicially ordained immunity from the terms of the Sherman Act for its restraints of trade\u2014that we should overlook its restrictions because they happen to fall at the intersection of higher education, sports, and money\u2014we cannot agree. This Court has regularly refused materially identical requests from litigants seeking special dispensationfrom the Sherman Act on the ground that their restraintsof trade serve uniquely important social objectives beyondenhancing competition.<\/p>\n

Take two examples. In National Soc. of Professional Engineers v. United States, 435 U. S. 679 (1978), a trade association argued that price competition between engineers competing for building projects had to be restrained to ensure quality work and protect public safety. Id., at 679\u2013 680. This Court rejected that appeal as \u201cnothing less thana frontal assault on the basic policy of the Sherman Act.\u201d Id., at 695. The \u201cstatutory policy\u201d of the Act is one of competition and it \u201cprecludes inquiry into the question whether competition is good or bad.\u201d Ibid. In FTC v. Superior Court Trial Lawyers Assn., 493 U. S. 411 (1990), criminal defense lawyers agreed among themselves to refuse court appointments until the government increased their compensation. Id., at 414. And once more the Court refused to consider whether this restraint of trade served some social good more important than competition: \u201cThe social justifications proffered for respondents\u2019 restraint of trade . . . do not make it any less unlawful.\u201d Id., at 424.<\/p>\n

To be sure, this Court once dallied with something that looks a bit like an antitrust exemption for professional baseball. In Federal Baseball Club of Baltimore, Inc. v. National League of Professional Baseball Clubs, 259 U. S. 200 (1922),the Court reasoned that \u201cexhibitions\u201d of \u201cbase ball\u201d did not implicate the Sherman Act because they did not involve interstate trade or commerce\u2014even though teams regularlycrossed state lines (as they do today) to make money and enhance their commercial success. Id., at 208\u2013209. But this Court has refused to extend Federal Baseball\u2019s reasoning to other sports leagues\u2014and has even acknowledgedcriticisms of the decision as \u201c\u2018unrealistic\u2019\u201d and \u201c\u2018inconsistent\u2019\u201d and \u201caberration[al].\u201d Flood v. Kuhn, 407 U. S. 258, 282 (1972) (quoting Radovich v. National Football League, 352 U. S. 445, 452 (1957)); see also Brief for Advocates for Minor Leaguers as Amicus Curiae 5, n. 3 (gathering criticisms). Indeed, as we have seen, this Court has already recognized that the NCAA itself is subject to the Sherman Act.<\/p>\n

The \u201corderly way\u201d to temper that Act\u2019s policy of competition is \u201cby legislation and not by court decision.\u201d Flood, 407
\nU. S., at 279. The NCAA is free to argue that, \u201cbecause ofthe special characteristics of [its] particular industry,\u201d it should be exempt from the usual operation of the antitrust laws\u2014but that appeal is \u201cproperly addressed to Congress.\u201d National Soc. of Professional Engineers, 435 U. S., at 689. Nor has Congress been insensitive to such requests. It has modified the antitrust laws for certain industries in the past, and it may do so again in the future. See, e.g., 7 U. S. C. \u00a7\u00a7291\u2013292 (agricultural cooperatives); 15 U. S. C.\u00a7\u00a71011\u20131013 (insurance); 15 U. S. C. \u00a7\u00a71801\u20131804 (newspaper joint operating agreements). But until Congress saysotherwise, the only law it has asked us to enforce is the Sherman Act, and that law is predicated on one assumption alone\u2014\u201ccompetition is the best method of allocating resources\u201d in the Nation\u2019s economy. National Soc. of Professional Engineers, 435 U. S., at 695.
\nIII A<\/p>\n

While the NCAA devotes most of its energy to resisting the rule of reason in its usual form, the league lodges some objections to the district court\u2019s application of it as well.<\/p>\n

When describing the rule of reason, this Court has sometimes spoken of \u201ca three-step, burden-shifting framework\u201d as a means for \u201c\u2018distinguish[ing] between restraints withanticompetitive effect that are harmful to the consumer and restraints stimulating competition that are in the consumer\u2019s best interest.\u2019\u201d American Express Co., 585 U. S., at ___ (slip op., at 9). As we have described it, \u201cthe plaintiff has the initial burden to prove that the challenged restraint has a substantial anticompetitive effect.\u201d Ibid. Should the plaintiff carry that burden, the burden then \u201cshifts to the defendant to show a procompetitive rationale for the restraint.\u201d Ibid. If the defendant can make that showing,\u201cthe burden shifts back to the plaintiff to demonstrate thatthe procompetitive efficiencies could be reasonablyachieved through less anticompetitive means.\u201d Id., at ___\u2013 ___ (slip op., at 9\u201310).<\/p>\n

These three steps do not represent a rote checklist, normay they be employed as an inflexible substitute for careful analysis. As we have seen, what is required to assess whether a challenged restraint harms competition can varydepending on the circumstances. See supra, at 15\u201319. The whole point of the rule of reason is to furnish \u201can enquirymeet for the case, looking to the circumstances, details, andlogic of a restraint\u201d to ensure that it unduly harms competition before a court declares it unlawful. California Dental, 526 U. S., at 781; see also, e.g., Leegin Creative, 551 U. S., at 885 (\u201c\u2018[T]he factfinder weighs all of the circumstances of a case in deciding whether a restrictive practice should beprohibited as imposing an unreasonable restraint on competition\u2019\u201d); Copperweld Corp. v. Independence Tube Corp., 467 U. S. 752, 768 (1984); 7 Areeda & Hovenkamp \u00b61507a,at 442\u2013444 (slightly different \u201cdecisional model\u201d using sequential questions).<\/p>\n

In the proceedings below, the district court followed circuit precedent to apply a multistep framework closely akin to American Express\u2019s. As its first step, the district courtrequired the student-athletes to show that \u201cthe challenged restraints produce significant anticompetitive effects in the relevant market.\u201d D. Ct. Op., at 1067. This was no slight burden. According to one amicus, courts have disposed ofnearly all rule of reason cases in the last 45 years on the ground that the plaintiff failed to show a substantial anticompetitive effect. Brief for 65 Professors of Law, Business, Economics, and Sports Management as Amici Curiae 21,
\nn. 9 (\u201cSince 1977, courts decided 90% (809 of 897) on this ground\u201d). This suit proved different. As we have seen,
\nbased on a voluminous record, the district court held that the student-athletes had shown the NCAA enjoys the power to set wages in the market for student-athletes\u2019 labor\u2014and that the NCAA has exercised that power in ways that haveproduced significant anticompetitive effects. See D. Ct. Op., at 1067. Perhaps even more notably, the NCAA \u201cdid not meaningfully dispute\u201d this conclusion. Ibid.<\/p>\n

Unlike so many cases, then, the district court proceeded to the second step, asking whether the NCAA could mustera procompetitive rationale for its restraints. Id., at 1070. This is where the NCAA claims error first crept in. On its account, the district court examined the challenged rules atdifferent levels of generality. At the first step of its inquiry,the court asked whether the NCAA\u2019s entire package of compensation restrictions has substantial anticompetitive effects collectively. Yet, at the second step, the NCAA saysthe district court required it to show that each of its distinctrules limiting student-athlete compensation has procompetitive benefits individually. The NCAA says this mismatch had the result of effectively\u2014and erroneously\u2014requiring it to prove that each rule is the least restrictive means of achieving the procompetitive purpose of differentiating college sports and preserving demand for them.<\/p>\n

We agree with the NCAA\u2019s premise that antitrust law does not require businesses to use anything like the least restrictive means of achieving legitimate business purposes. To the contrary, courts should not second-guess \u201cdegrees of reasonable necessity\u201d so that \u201cthe lawfulness of conduct turn[s] upon judgments of degrees of efficiency.\u201d Rothery Storage, 792 F. 2d, at 227; Continental T. V., Inc. v. GTE Sylvania Inc., 433 U. S. 36, 58, n. 29 (1977). That would be a recipe for disaster, for a \u201cskilled lawyer\u201d will\u201chave little difficulty imagining possible less restrictive alternatives to most joint arrangements.\u201d 11 Areeda & Hovenkamp \u00b61913b, p. 398 (2018). And judicial acceptance of such imaginings would risk interfering \u201cwith the legitimate objectives at issue\u201d without \u201cadding that much to competition.\u201d 7 id., \u00b61505b, at 435\u2013436.<\/p>\n

Even worse, \u201c[r]ules that seek to embody every economic complexity and qualification may well, through the vagaries of administration, prove counter-productive, undercutting the very economic ends they seek to serve.\u201d Barry Wright Corp. v. ITT Grinnell Corp., 724 F. 2d 227, 234 (CA1 1983) (BREYER, J.). After all, even \u201c[u]nder the best of circumstances,\u201d applying the antitrust laws \u201c\u2018can be difficult\u2019\u201d\u2014and mistaken condemnations of legitimate business arrangements \u201c\u2018are especially costly, because they chill thevery\u2019\u201d procompetitive conduct \u201c\u2018the antitrust laws are designed to protect.\u2019\u201d Verizon Communications Inc. v. Law Offices of Curtis V. Trinko, LLP, 540 U. S. 398, 414 (2004). Indeed, static judicial decrees in ever-evolving markets may themselves facilitate collusion or frustrate entry and competition. Ibid. To know that the Sherman Act prohibits only unreasonable restraints of trade is thus to know that attempts to \u201c\u2018[m]ete[r]\u2019 small deviations is not an appropriate antitrust function.\u201d Hovenkamp, Antitrust Balancing,12 N. Y. U. J. L. & Bus. 369, 377 (2016).<\/p>\n

While we agree with the NCAA\u2019s legal premise, we cannot say the same for its factual one. Yes, at the first step of its inquiry, the district court held that the student-athletes had met their burden of showing the NCAA\u2019s restraints collectively bear an anticompetitive effect. And, given that,yes, at step two the NCAA had to show only that those same rules collectively yield a procompetitive benefit. The trouble for the NCAA, though, is not the level of generality. It is the fact that the district court found unpersuasive muchof its proffered evidence. See D. Ct. Op., at 1070\u20131076,1080\u20131083. Recall that the court found the NCAA failed \u201cto establish that the challenged compensation rules . . . have any direct connection to consumer demand.\u201d Id., at 1070.<\/p>\n

To be sure, there is a wrinkle here. While finding the NCAA had failed to establish that its rules collectively sustain consumer demand, the court did find that \u201csome\u201d of those rules \u201cmay\u201d have procompetitive effects \u201cto the extent\u201d they prohibit compensation \u201cunrelated to education, akin to salaries seen in professional sports leagues.\u201d Id., at 1082\u20131083. The court then proceeded to what correspondsto the third step of the American Express framework, where it required the student-athletes \u201cto show that there are substantially less restrictive alternative rules that wouldachieve the same procompetitive effect as the challengedset of rules.\u201d D. Ct. Op., at 1104. And there, of course, the district court held that the student-athletes partially succeeded\u2014they were able to show that the NCAA could achieve the procompetitive benefits it had established with substantially less restrictive restraints on education-related benefits.<\/p>\n

Even acknowledging this wrinkle, we see nothing about the district court\u2019s analysis that offends the legal principlesthe NCAA invokes. The court\u2019s judgment ultimately turnedon the key question at the third step: whether the student-athletes could prove that \u201csubstantially less restrictive alternative rules\u201d existed to achieve the same procompetitivebenefits the NCAA had proven at the second step. Ibid. Of course, deficiencies in the NCAA\u2019s proof of procompetitivebenefits at the second step influenced the analysis at the third. But that is only because, however framed and at whichever step, anticompetitive restraints of trade maywind up flunking the rule of reason to the extent the evidence shows that substantially less restrictive means exist to achieve any proven procompetitive benefits. See, e.g., 7 Areeda & Hovenkamp \u00b61505, p. 428 (\u201cTo be sure, these two questions can be collapsed into one,\u201d since a \u201clegitimate objective that is not promoted by the challenged restraint canbe equally served by simply abandoning the restraint, which is surely a less restrictive alternative\u201d).<\/p>\n

Simply put, the district court nowhere\u2014expressly or effectively\u2014required the NCAA to show that its rules constituted the least restrictive means of preserving consumer demand. Rather, it was only after finding the NCAA\u2019srestraints \u201c\u2018patently and inexplicably stricter than is necessary\u2019\u201d to achieve the procompetitive benefits the league had demonstrated that the district court proceeded to declare a violation of the Sherman Act. D. Ct. Op., at 1104. That demanding standard hardly presages a future filled with judicial micromanagement of legitimate business decisions.<\/p>\n

B In a related critique, the NCAA contends the district court \u201cimpermissibly redefined\u201d its \u201cproduct\u201d by rejectingits views about what amateurism requires and replacing them with its preferred conception. Brief for Petitioner in No. 20\u2013512, at 35\u201336. This argument, however, misapprehends the way a defendant\u2019s procompetitive business justification relates tothe antitrust laws. Firms deserve substantial latitude to fashion agreements that serve legitimate business interests\u2014agreements that may include efforts aimed at introducing a new product into the marketplace. Supra, at 15\u2013 19.<\/p>\n

But none of that means a party can relabel a restraint as a product feature and declare it \u201cimmune from \u00a71 scrutiny.\u201d American Needle, 560 U. S., at 199, n. 7. In this suit, as in any, the district court had to determine whether the defendants\u2019 agreements harmed competition and whether any procompetitive benefits associated with their restraintscould be achieved by \u201csubstantially less restrictive alternative\u201d means. D. Ct. Op., at 1104.<\/p>\n

The NCAA\u2019s argument not only misapprehends the inquiry, it would require us to overturn the district court\u2019s factual findings. While the NCAA asks us to defer to its conception of amateurism, the district court found that the NCAA had not adopted any consistent definition. Id., at 1070. Instead, the court found, the NCAA\u2019s rules and restrictions on compensation have shifted markedly overtime. Id., at 1071\u20131074. The court found, too, that the NCAA adopted these restrictions without any reference to\u201cconsiderations of consumer demand,\u201d id., at 1100, and that some were \u201cnot necessary to preserve consumer demand,\u201d id., at 1075, 1080, 1104. None of this is product redesign; itis a straightforward application of the rule of reason.<\/p>\n

C Finally, the NCAA attacks as \u201cindefensible\u201d the lower courts\u2019 holding that substantially less restrictive alternatives exist capable of delivering the same procompetitivebenefits as its current rules. Brief for Petitioner in No. 20\u2013 512, at 46. The NCAA claims, too, that the district court\u2019s injunction threatens to \u201cmicromanage\u201d its business. Id., at 50. Once more, we broadly agree with the legal principles theNCAA invokes. As we have discussed, antitrust courts must give wide berth to business judgments before finding liability. See supra, at 15\u201319. Similar considerations applywhen it comes to the remedy. Judges must be sensitive tothe possibility that the \u201ccontinuing supervision of a highly detailed decree\u201d could wind up impairing rather than enhancing competition. Trinko, 540 U. S., at 415. Costs associated with ensuring compliance with judicial decrees mayexceed efficiencies gained; the decrees themselves may unintentionally suppress procompetitive innovation and even facilitate collusion. See supra, at 26\u201327. Judges must bewary, too, of the temptation to specify \u201cthe proper price,quantity, and other terms of dealing\u201d\u2014cognizant that they are neither economic nor industry experts. Trinko, 540
\nU. S., at 408. Judges must be open to reconsideration and modification of decrees in light of changing market realities, for \u201cwhat we see may vary over time.\u201d California Dental, 526 U. S., at 781. And throughout courts must have a healthy respect for the practical limits of judicial administration: \u201cAn antitrust court is unlikely to be an effective day-to-day enforcer\u201d of a detailed decree, able to keep pacewith changing market dynamics alongside a busy docket. Trinko, 540 U. S., at 415. Nor should any court \u201c\u2018impose a duty . . . that it cannot explain or adequately and reasonably supervise.\u2019\u201d Ibid. In short, judges make for poor \u201ccentral planners\u201d and should never aspire to the role. Id., at 408.<\/p>\n

Once again, though, we think the district court honoredthese principles. The court enjoined only restraints on ed-ucation-related benefits\u2014such as those limiting scholarships for graduate school, payments for tutoring, and thelike. The court did so, moreover, only after finding that relaxing these restrictions would not blur the distinction between college and professional sports and thus impair demand\u2014and only after finding that this course represented a significantly (not marginally) less restrictive means ofachieving the same procompetitive benefits as the NCAA\u2019scurrent rules. D. Ct. Op., at 1104\u20131105.<\/p>\n

Even with respect to education-related benefits, the district court extended the NCAA considerable leeway. As we have seen, the court provided that the NCAA could develop its own definition of benefits that relate to education and seek modification of the court\u2019s injunction to reflect thatdefinition. App. to Pet. for Cert. in No. 20\u2013512, at 168a, \u00b64.The court explained that the NCAA and its members could agree on rules regulating how conferences and schools go about providing these education-related benefits. Ibid. The court said that the NCAA and its members could continue fixing education-related cash awards, too\u2014so long as those\u201climits are never lower than the limit\u201d on awards for athletic performance. D. Ct. Op., at 1104; App. to Pet. for Cert. in No. 20\u2013512, at 168a\u2013169a, \u00b65. And the court emphasized that its injunction applies only to the NCAA and multiconference agreements; individual conferences remain free toreimpose every single enjoined restraint tomorrow\u2014or more restrictive ones still. Id., at 169a\u2013170a, \u00b6\u00b66\u20137.<\/p>\n

In the end, it turns out that the NCAA\u2019s complaints reallyboil down to three principal objections.
\nFirst, the NCAA worries about the district court\u2019s inclusion of paid posteligibility internships among the education-related benefits it approved. The NCAA fears that schools will use internships as a way of circumventing limits on payments that student-athletes may receive for athletic performance. The NCAA even imagines that boosters might promise posteligibility internships \u201cat a sneaker company or auto dealership\u201d with extravagant salaries as a \u201cthinly disguised vehicle\u201d for paying professional-level salaries. Brief for Petitioner in No. 20\u2013512, at 37\u201338.
\nThis argument rests on an overly broad reading of the injunction. The district court enjoined only restrictions oneducation-related compensation or benefits \u201cthat may bemade available from conferences or schools.\u201d App. to Pet. for Cert. in No. 20\u2013512, at 167a, \u00b61 (emphasis added). Accordingly, as the student-athletes concede, the injunction\u201cdoes not stop the NCAA from continuing to prohibit compensation from\u201d sneaker companies, auto dealerships,boosters, \u201cor anyone else.\u201d Brief for Respondents 47\u201348; seealso Brief for United States as Amicus Curiae 33. The NCAA itself seems to understand this much. Following thedistrict court\u2019s injunction, the organization adopted new regulations specifying that only \u201ca conference or institution\u201d may fund post-eligibility internships. See Decl. of M. Boyer in No. 4:14\u2013md\u201302541, ECF Doc. 1302\u20132, p. 6 (ND Cal., Sept. 22, 2020) (NCAA Bylaw 16.3.4(d)).<\/p>\n

Even when it comes to internships offered by conferences and schools, the district court left the NCAA considerable flexibility. The court refused to enjoin NCAA rules prohibiting its members from providing compensation or benefits unrelated to legitimate educational activities\u2014thus leaving the league room to police phony internships. As we\u2019ve observed, the district court also allowed the NCAA to propose (and enforce) rules defining what benefits do and do not relate to education. App. to Pet. for Cert. in No. 20\u2013512, at 168a, \u00b64. Accordingly, the NCAA may seek whatever limits on paid internships it thinks appropriate. And, again, the court stressed that individual conferences may restrict internships however they wish. Id., at 169a, \u00b66. All these features underscore the modesty of the current decree.<\/p>\n

Second, the NCAA attacks the district court\u2019s ruling thatit may fix the aggregate limit on awards schools may give for \u201cacademic or graduation\u201d achievement no lower than itsaggregate limit on parallel athletic awards (currently$5,980 per year). Id., at 168a\u2013169a, \u00b65; D. Ct. Op., at 1104. This, the NCAA asserts, \u201cis the very definition of a professional salary.\u201d Brief for Petitioner in No. 20\u2013512, at 48. The NCAA also represents that \u201c[m]ost\u201d of its currently permissible athletic awards are \u201cfor genuine individual or team achievement\u201d and that \u201c[m]ost . . . are received by only a few student-athletes each year.\u201d Ibid. Meanwhile, the NCAA says, the district court\u2019s decree would allow a school to pay players thousands of dollars each year for minimal achievements like maintaining a passing GPA. Ibid.<\/p>\n

The basis for this critique is unclear. The NCAA does not believe that the athletic awards it presently allows are tantamount to a professional salary. And this portion of the injunction sprang directly from the district court\u2019s findingthat the cap on athletic participation awards \u201cis an amount that has been shown not to decrease consumer demand.\u201d D. Ct. Op., at 1088. Indeed, there was no evidence before the district court suggesting that corresponding academicawards would impair consumer interest in any way. Again, too, the district court\u2019s injunction affords the NCAA leeway.It leaves the NCAA free to reduce its athletic awards. And it does not ordain what criteria schools must use for their academic and graduation awards. So, once more, if the NCAA believes certain criteria are needed to ensure that academic awards are legitimately related to education, it is presently free to propose such rules\u2014and individual conferences may adopt even stricter ones.<\/p>\n

Third, the NCAA contends that allowing schools to provide in-kind educational benefits will pose a problem. This relief focuses on allowing schools to offer scholarships for\u201cgraduate degrees\u201d or \u201cvocational school\u201d and to pay for things like \u201ccomputers\u201d and \u201ctutoring.\u201d App. to Pet. forCert. in No. 20\u2013512, at 167a\u2013168a, \u00b62. But the NCAA fears schools might exploit this authority to give student-athletes\u201c\u2018luxury cars\u2019\u201d \u201cto get to class\u201d and \u201cother unnecessary orinordinately valuable items\u201d only \u201cnominally\u201d related to education. Brief for Petitioner in No. 20\u2013512, at 48\u201349.<\/p>\n

Again, however, this over-reads the injunction in ways wehave seen and need not belabor. Under the current decree, the NCAA is free to forbid in-kind benefits unrelated to a student\u2019s actual education; nothing stops it from enforcing a \u201cno Lamborghini\u201d rule. And, again, the district court invited the NCAA to specify and later enforce rules delineating which benefits it considers legitimately related to education. To the extent the NCAA believes meaningfulambiguity really exists about the scope of its authority\u2014regarding internships, academic awards, in-kind benefits, or anything else\u2014it has been free to seek clarification from the district court since the court issued its injunction three years ago. The NCAA remains free to do so today. To date, the NCAA has sought clarification only once\u2014about the precise amount at which it can cap academic awards\u2014andthe question was quickly resolved. Before conjuring hypothetical concerns in this Court, we believe it best for the NCAA to present any practically important question it hasin district court first.<\/p>\n

When it comes to fashioning an antitrust remedy, weacknowledge that caution is key. Judges must resist the temptation to require that enterprises employ the least restrictive means of achieving their legitimate business objectives. Judges must be mindful, too, of their limitations\u2014as generalists, as lawyers, and as outsiders trying to understand intricate business relationships. Judges must remain aware that markets are often more effective than the heavy hand of judicial power when it comes to enhancingconsumer welfare. And judges must be open to clarifying and reconsidering their decrees in light of changing marketrealities. Courts reviewing complex business arrangements should, in other words, be wary about invitations to\u201cset sail on a sea of doubt.\u201d United States v. Addyston Pipe & Steel Co., 85 F. 271, 284 (CA6 1898) (Taft, J.). But we do not believe the district court fell prey to that temptation.Its judgment does not float on a sea of doubt but stands onfirm ground\u2014an exhaustive factual record, a thoughtful legal analysis consistent with established antitrust principles, and a healthy dose of judicial humility.<\/p>\n

* Some will think the district court did not go far enough. By permitting colleges and universities to offer enhanced education-related benefits, its decision may encourage scholastic achievement and allow student-athletes a measure of compensation more consistent with the value they bring to their schools. Still, some will see this as a poor substitute for fuller relief. At the same time, others will think the district court went too far by undervaluing the social benefits associated with amateur athletics. For our part, though, we can only agree with the Ninth Circuit:\u201c\u2018The national debate about amateurism in college sports is important. But our task as appellate judges is not to resolve it. Nor could we. Our task is simply to review the districtcourt judgment through the appropriate lens of antitrust law.\u2019\u201d 958 F. 3d, at 1265. That review persuades us the district court acted within the law\u2019s bounds.”<\/p>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"

Washington, DC…In many cases such as this we believe the best way we can provide accurate news is let the newsmakers speak for themselves. This case is no different as the Supreme Court’s Opinion is better than any summary we could provide. Justice Gorsuch delivered the opinion of the Court and it follows. Click the […]<\/p>\n","protected":false},"author":1,"featured_media":123158,"comment_status":"open","ping_status":"open","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":{"_cbd_carousel_blocks":"[]","jetpack_post_was_ever_published":false,"_jetpack_newsletter_access":"","_jetpack_dont_email_post_to_subs":false,"_jetpack_newsletter_tier_id":0,"_jetpack_memberships_contains_paywalled_content":false,"_jetpack_memberships_contains_paid_content":false,"footnotes":""},"categories":[3,6,20,5,16,1,28],"tags":[],"class_list":["post-123157","post","type-post","status-publish","format-standard","has-post-thumbnail","hentry","category-business","category-education","category-featured","category-government","category-law-enforcement","category-news","category-sports","last_archivepost"],"jetpack_featured_media_url":"https:\/\/new.thepinetree.net\/wp-content\/uploads\/2021\/06\/2021_Roberts_Court_Formal_131209_Web2.jpg","jetpack_sharing_enabled":true,"jetpack-related-posts":[],"_links":{"self":[{"href":"https:\/\/new.thepinetree.net\/index.php?rest_route=\/wp\/v2\/posts\/123157","targetHints":{"allow":["GET"]}}],"collection":[{"href":"https:\/\/new.thepinetree.net\/index.php?rest_route=\/wp\/v2\/posts"}],"about":[{"href":"https:\/\/new.thepinetree.net\/index.php?rest_route=\/wp\/v2\/types\/post"}],"author":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/new.thepinetree.net\/index.php?rest_route=\/wp\/v2\/users\/1"}],"replies":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/new.thepinetree.net\/index.php?rest_route=%2Fwp%2Fv2%2Fcomments&post=123157"}],"version-history":[{"count":0,"href":"https:\/\/new.thepinetree.net\/index.php?rest_route=\/wp\/v2\/posts\/123157\/revisions"}],"wp:featuredmedia":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/new.thepinetree.net\/index.php?rest_route=\/wp\/v2\/media\/123158"}],"wp:attachment":[{"href":"https:\/\/new.thepinetree.net\/index.php?rest_route=%2Fwp%2Fv2%2Fmedia&parent=123157"}],"wp:term":[{"taxonomy":"category","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/new.thepinetree.net\/index.php?rest_route=%2Fwp%2Fv2%2Fcategories&post=123157"},{"taxonomy":"post_tag","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/new.thepinetree.net\/index.php?rest_route=%2Fwp%2Fv2%2Ftags&post=123157"}],"curies":[{"name":"wp","href":"https:\/\/api.w.org\/{rel}","templated":true}]}}