![\"\"](\"https:\/\/new.thepinetree.net\/wp-content\/uploads\/2024\/06\/enronj6court.jpg\")
<\/a><\/p>\nOn that day, Congress convened in a joint session to certify the votes in the 2020 Presidential election. While they did so, a crowd of supporters of then-President Donald Trump gathered outside the Capitol, and some eventually forced their way into the building, breaking windows and assaulting police. App. 189. This breach of the Capitol delayed the certification of the vote. The criminal complaint alleges that Fischer was among those who invaded the building. Fischer was charged with various crimes for his actions on January 6, including obstructing an official proceeding in violation of \u00a71512(c)(2). He moved to dismiss that charge, arguing that the provision criminalizes only attempts to impair the availability or integrity of evidence. The District Court granted his motion in relevant part. A divided panel of the D. C. Circuit reversed and remanded for further proceedings.<\/p>\n
Held: To prove a violation of \u00a71512(c)(2), the Government must establish that the defendant impaired the availability or integrity for use in an official proceeding of records, documents, objects, or other things used in an official proceeding, or attempted to do so.<\/p>\n
(a) To determine the scope of the residual \u201cotherwise\u201d clause in \u00a71512(c)(2), the Court must decide how it is linked to its \u201csurrounding words,\u201d Yates v. United States, 574 U. S. 528, 536 (plurality opinion), and \u201c \u2018give effect, if possible, to every clause and word of [the] statute.\u2019 \u201d Williams v. Taylor, 529 U. S. 362, 404 (quoting United States v. Menasche, 348 U. S. 528, 538-539). The Court considers both \u201cthe specific context\u201d in which (c)(2) appears \u201cand the broader context of the statute as a whole.\u201d Robinson v. Shell Oil Co., 519 U. S. 337, 341.<\/p>\n
(1) Section 1512(c)(1) describes particular types of criminal conduct in specific terms. The purpose of (c)(2) is, as the parties agree, to cover some set of \u201cmatters not specifically contemplated\u201d by (c)(1). Republic of Iraq v. Beaty, 556 U. S. 848, 860. Perhaps Congress sought to criminalize all obstructive acts in \u00a71512(c), and having named a few examples in (c)(1), devised (c)(2) to prohibit the rest. But (c)(2) could have a narrower scope if Congress designed it to fill inadvertent gaps in the focused language of (c)(1).<\/p>\n
One way to discern the reach of an \u201cotherwise\u201d clause is to look for guidance from whatever examples come before it. Two general principles are relevant. First, the canon of noscitur a sociis teaches that a word is \u201cgiven more precise content by the neighboring words with which it is associated.\u201d United States v. Williams, 553 U. S. 285, 294. And under the related canon of ejusdem generis, a general or collective term at the end of a list of specific items is typically controlled and defined by reference to those specific items that precede it. Southwest Airlines Co. v. Saxon, 596 U. S. 450, 458. These approaches to statutory interpretation track the common sense intuition that Congress would not ordinarily introduce a general term that renders meaningless the specific text that accompanies it.<\/p>\n
Under these principles, the \u201cotherwise\u201d provision of \u00a71512(c)(2) is limited by the list of specific criminal violations that precede it in (c)(1). If, as the Government asserts, (c)(2) covers all forms of obstructive conduct beyond \u00a71512(c)(1)\u2019s focus on evidence impairment, Congress would have had little reason to provide any specific examples at all. And the sweep of subsection (c)(2) would swallow (c)(1), leaving that narrower provision with no work to do.<\/p>\n
Tethering subsection (c)(2) to the context of (c)(1) recognizes the distinct purpose of each provision. Subsection (c)(1) refers to a defined set of offense conduct\u2014four types of actions that, by their nature, impair the integrity or availability of records, documents, or objects for use in an official proceeding. Reading the \u201cotherwise\u201d clause as having been given more precise content by (c)(1), subsection (c)(2) makes it a crime to impair the availability or integrity of records, documents, or objects used in an official proceeding in ways other than those specified in (c)(1). For example, it is possible to violate (c)(2) by creating false evidence\u2014rather than altering incriminating evidence. Subsection (c)(2) also ensures that liability is still imposed for impairing the availability or integrity of other things used in an official proceeding beyond the \u201crecord[s], document[s], or other object[s]\u201d enumerated in (c)(1), such as witness testimony or intangible information.<\/p>\n
(2)
\nIt makes sense to read (c)(2) as limited by (c)(1) in light of the history of the provision. The Enron accounting scandal exposed a loophole in \u00a71512. At that time, the statute imposed liability on anyone who, among other things, corruptly persuaded another person to shred documents. But it curiously failed to impose liability on a person who destroyed records himself. The parties agree that Congress enacted \u00a71512(c) as part of the broader Sarbanes-Oxley Act to plug this loophole. It would be peculiar to conclude that in closing the Enron gap, Congress created a catch-all provision that reaches beyond the scenarios that prompted the legislation.
\n(b)
\nThe broader context of \u00a71512 in the criminal code confirms that(c)(2) is limited by the scope of (c)(1). Federal obstruction law consists of numerous provisions that target specific criminal acts and settings, much of which would be unnecessary if (c)(2) criminalized essentially all obstructive conduct. Given the Court\u2019s obligation to give meaning where possible to each word and provision in the Code, Taylor, 529
\nU.
\nS., at 404, the Court\u2019s narrower interpretation of subsection (c)(2) is the superior one.
\nAn unbounded interpretation of subsection (c)(2) would also render superfluous the careful delineation of different types of obstructive conduct in \u00a71512 itself. That section provides a reticulated list of nearly two dozen means of committing obstruction with penalties ranging from three years to life in prison, or even death. The Government\u2019s reading would lump together under (c)(2) disparate types of conduct for which Congress had assigned proportionate sentences.
\n(c)
\nThe Government\u2019s theory would also criminalize a broad swath of prosaic conduct, exposing activists and lobbyist to decades in prison. Our usual approach in obstruction cases has been to \u201cresist reading\u201d particular sub-provisions \u201cto create a coverall statute.\u201d Yates, 574
\nU.
\nS., at 549 (plurality opinion). Nothing in the text or statutory history gives the Court a reason to depart from that practice today. And the Government\u2019s interpretation would give prosecutors broad discretion to seek a 20-year maximum sentence for acts Congress saw fit to punish with far shorter sentences. By reading (c)(2) in light of (c)(1), the Court affords proper respect to \u201cthe prerogatives of Congress\u201d in carrying out the quintessentially legislative act of defining crimes and setting the penalties for them. United States v. Aguilar, 515 U. S. 593, 600.
\n64 F. 4th 329, vacated and remanded.”<\/p>\n