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<\/a><\/p>\nClick Above For Full Decision<\/p>\n
For much of our history, Fourth Amendment search doctrine was \u201ctied to common-law trespass\u201d and focused on whether the Government \u201cobtains information by physically intruding on a constitutionally protected area.\u201d United States v. Jones, 565 U. S. 400, 405, 406, n. 3 (2012).More recently, the Court has recognized that \u201cproperty rights are not the sole measure of Fourth Amendment violations.\u201d Soldal v. Cook County, 506 U. S. 56, 64 (1992). In Katz v. United States, 389 U. S. 347, 351 (1967),we established that \u201cthe Fourth Amendment protects people, not places,\u201d and expanded our conception of the Amendment to protect certain expectations of privacy as well. When an individual \u201cseeks to preserve something as private,\u201d and his expectation of privacy is \u201cone that society is prepared to recognize as reasonable,\u201d we have held that official intrusion into that private sphere generally qualifies as a search and requires a warrant supported by probable cause. Smith, 442 U. S., at 740 (internal quotation marks and alterations omitted).<\/p>\n
Although no single rubric definitively resolves which expectations of privacy are entitled to protection,1 the
\n\u2014\u2014\u2014\u2014\u2014\u2014 1 JUSTICE KENNEDY believes that there is such a rubric\u2014the \u201cproperty-based concepts\u201d that Katz purported to move beyond. Post, at 3 (dissenting opinion). But while property rights are often informative, our cases by no means suggest that such an interest is \u201cfundamental\u201d or \u201cdispositive\u201d in determining which expectations of privacy are legitimate. Post, at 8\u20139. JUSTICE THOMAS (and to a large extent JUSTICE GORSUCH) would have us abandon Katz and return to an analysis is informed by historical understandings \u201cof what was deemed an unreasonable search and seizure when [the Fourth Amendment] was adopted.\u201d Carroll v. United States, 267 U. S. 132, 149 (1925). On this score, our cases have recognized some basic guideposts. First, that the Amendment seeks to secure \u201cthe privacies of life\u201d against \u201carbitrary power.\u201d Boyd v. United States, 116 U. S. 616, 630 (1886). Second, and relatedly, that a central aim of the Framers was \u201cto place obstacles in the way of a toopermeating police surveillance.\u201d United States v. Di Re, 332 U. S. 581, 595 (1948).<\/p>\n
We have kept this attention to Founding-era understandings in mind when applying the Fourth Amendmentto innovations in surveillance tools. As technology has enhanced the Government\u2019s capacity to encroach upon areas normally guarded from inquisitive eyes, this Court has sought to \u201cassure[ ] preservation of that degree of privacy against government that existed when the Fourth Amendment was adopted.\u201d Kyllo v. United States, 533
\nU. S. 27, 34 (2001). For that reason, we rejected in Kyllo a \u201cmechanical interpretation\u201d of the Fourth Amendment and held that use of a thermal imager to detect heat radiating from the side of the defendant\u2019s home was a search. Id., at 35. Because any other conclusion would leave homeowners \u201cat the mercy of advancing technology,\u201d we determined that the Government\u2014absent a warrant\u2014could not capitalize on such new sense-enhancing technology to explore what was happening within the home. Ibid.<\/p>\n
Likewise in Riley, the Court recognized the \u201cimmense storage capacity\u201d of modern cell phones in holding that police officers must generally obtain a warrant before searching the contents of a phone. 573 U. S., at ___ (slip op., at 17). We explained that while the general rule allowing warrantless searches incident to arrest \u201cstrikes the appropriate balance in the context of physical objects,neither of its rationales has much force with respect to\u201d the vast store of sensitive information on a cell phone. Id., at ___ (slip op., at 9).
\nB<\/p>\n
The case before us involves the Government\u2019s acquisition of wireless carrier cell-site records revealing the location of Carpenter\u2019s cell phone whenever it made or received calls. This sort of digital data\u2014personal location information maintained by a third party\u2014does not fit neatly under existing precedents. Instead, requests for cell-site records lie at the intersection of two lines of cases, both of which inform our understanding of the privacy interests at stake. The first set of cases addresses a person\u2019s expectation of privacy in his physical location and movements.<\/p>\n
In United States v. Knotts, 460 U. S. 276 (1983), we considered the Government\u2019s use of a \u201cbeeper\u201d to aid in tracking a vehicle through traffic. Police officers in that case planted a beeper in a container of chloroform before it was purchased by one of Knotts\u2019s co-conspirators. The officers (with intermittent aerial assistance) then followed the automobile carrying the container from Minneapolis to Knotts\u2019s cabin in Wisconsin, relying on the beeper\u2019s signal to help keep the vehicle in view. The Court concluded that the \u201caugment[ed]\u201d visual surveillance did not constitute a search because \u201c[a] person traveling in an automobile on public thoroughfares has no reasonable expectation of privacy in his movements from one place to another.\u201d Id., at 281, 282. Since the movements of the vehicle and its final destination had been \u201cvoluntarily conveyed to anyone who wanted to look,\u201d Knotts could not assert a privacy interest in the information obtained. Id., at 281.<\/p>\n
This Court in Knotts, however, was careful to distinguish between the rudimentary tracking facilitated by the beeper and more sweeping modes of surveillance. The Court emphasized the \u201climited use which the government made of the signals from this particular beeper\u201d during a discrete \u201cautomotive journey.\u201d Id., at 284, 285. Significantly, the Court reserved the question whether \u201cdifferent constitutional principles may be applicable\u201d if \u201ctwenty-four hour surveillance of any citizen of this country [were] possible.\u201d Id., at 283\u2013284.<\/p>\n
Three decades later, the Court considered more sophisticated surveillance of the sort envisioned in Knotts and found that different principles did indeed apply. In United States v. Jones, FBI agents installed a GPS tracking device on Jones\u2019s vehicle and remotely monitored the vehicle\u2019s movements for 28 days. The Court decided the case based on the Government\u2019s physical trespass of the vehicle. 565 U. S., at 404\u2013405. At the same time, five Justices agreed that related privacy concerns would be raised by,for example, \u201csurreptitiously activating a stolen vehicle detection system\u201d in Jones\u2019s car to track Jones himself, or conducting GPS tracking of his cell phone. Id., at 426, 428 (ALITO, J., concurring in judgment); id., at 415 (SOTOMAYOR, J., concurring). Since GPS monitoring of a vehicle tracks \u201cevery movement\u201d a person makes in that vehicle, the concurring Justices concluded that \u201clonger term GPS monitoring in investigations of most offenses impinges on expectations of privacy\u201d\u2014regardless whether those movements were disclosed to the public at large. Id., at 430 (opinion of ALITO, J.); id., at 415 (opinion of
\nCite as: 585 U. S. ____ (2018) 9
\nOpinion of the Court
\nSOTOMAYOR, J.).2
\nIn a second set of decisions, the Court has drawn a line between what a person keeps to himself and what he shares with others. We have previously held that \u201ca person has no legitimate expectation of privacy in information he voluntarily turns over to third parties.\u201d Smith, 442
\nU. S., at 743\u2013744. That remains true \u201ceven if the information is revealed on the assumption that it will be used only for a limited purpose.\u201d United States v. Miller, 425
\nU. S. 435, 443 (1976).<\/p>\n
As a result, the Government is typically free to obtain such information from the recipientwithout triggering Fourth Amendment protections.<\/p>\n
This third-party doctrine largely traces its roots to Miller. While investigating Miller for tax evasion, the Government subpoenaed his banks, seeking several months of canceled checks, deposit slips, and monthly statements. The Court rejected a Fourth Amendment challenge to the records collection. For one, Miller could \u201cassert neither ownership nor possession\u201d of the documents; they were \u201cbusiness records of the banks.\u201d Id., at
\n440. For another, the nature of those records confirmed Miller\u2019s limited expectation of privacy, because the checks were \u201cnot confidential communications but negotiable instruments to be used in commercial transactions,\u201d and the bank statements contained information \u201cexposed to [bank] employees in the ordinary course of business.\u201d Id., at 442. The Court thus concluded that Miller had \u201ctake[n] the risk, in revealing his affairs to another, that the information [would] be conveyed by that person to the Government.\u201d Id., at 443.<\/p>\n
Three years later, Smith applied the same principles in the context of information conveyed to a telephone company. The Court ruled that the Government\u2019s use of a pen register\u2014a device that recorded the outgoing phone numbers dialed on a landline telephone\u2014was not a search.Noting the pen register\u2019s \u201climited capabilities,\u201d the Court \u201cdoubt[ed] that people in general entertain any actual expectation of privacy in the numbers they dial.\u201d 442
\nU. S., at 742. Telephone subscribers know, after all, that the numbers are used by the telephone company \u201cfor a variety of legitimate business purposes,\u201d including routing calls. Id., at 743. And at any rate, the Court explained, such an expectation \u201cis not one that society is prepared to recognize as reasonable.\u201d Ibid. (internal quotation marks omitted). When Smith placed a call, he \u201cvoluntarily conveyed\u201d the dialed numbers to the phone company by \u201cexpos[ing] that information to its equipment in the ordinary course of business.\u201d Id., at 744 (internal quotation marks omitted).<\/p>\n
Once again, we held that the defendant \u201cassumed the risk\u201d that the company\u2019s records \u201cwould be divulged to police.\u201d Id., at 745. III The question we confront today is how to apply the Fourth Amendment to a new phenomenon: the ability to chronicle a person\u2019s past movements through the record of his cell phone signals. Such tracking partakes of many of the qualities of the GPS monitoring we considered in Jones. Much like GPS tracking of a vehicle, cell phone location information is detailed, encyclopedic, and effortlessly compiled.<\/p>\n
At the same time, the fact that the individual continuously reveals his location to his wireless carrier implicates the third-party principle of Smith and Miller. But while the third-party doctrine applies to telephone numbers and bank records, it is not clear whether its logic extends to the qualitatively different category of cell-site records.After all, when Smith was decided in 1979, few could have imagined a society in which a phone goes wherever its owner goes, conveying to the wireless carrier not just dialed digits, but a detailed and comprehensive record of the person\u2019s movements.<\/p>\n
We decline to extend Smith and Miller to cover these novel circumstances. Given the unique nature of cellphone location records, the fact that the information is held by a third party does not by itself overcome the user\u2019s claim to Fourth Amendment protection. Whether the Government employs its own surveillance technology as in Jones or leverages the technology of a wireless carrier, we hold that an individual maintains a legitimate expectation of privacy in the record of his physical movements as captured through CSLI. The location information obtained from Carpenter\u2019s wireless carriers was the product of a search.<\/p>\n
The parties suggest as an alternative to their primary submissions that the acquisition of CSLI becomes a search only if it extends beyond a limited period. See Reply Brief 12 (proposing a 24-hour cutoff); Brieffor United States 55\u201356 (suggesting a seven-day cutoff). As part of its argument, the Government treats the seven days of CSLI requested from Sprint as the pertinent period, even though Sprint produced only two days of records. Brief for United States 56. Contrary to JUSTICE KENNEDY\u2019s assertion, post, at 19, we need not decide whether there is a limited period for which the Government may obtain an individual\u2019s historical CSLI free from Fourth Amendment scrutiny, and if so, how long that period might be. It is sufficient for our purposes today to hold that accessing seven days of CSLI constitutes a Fourth Amendment search.<\/p>\n
A person does not surrender all Fourth Amendment protection by venturing into the public sphere. To the contrary, \u201cwhat [one] seeks to preserve as private, even in an area accessible to the public, may be constitutionally protected.\u201d Katz, 389 U. S., at 351\u2013352. A majority of this Court has already recognized that individuals have a reasonable expectation of privacy in the whole of their physical movements. Jones, 565 U. S., at 430 (ALITO, J., concurring in judgment); id., at 415 (SOTOMAYOR, J., concurring). Prior to the digital age, law enforcement might have pursued a suspect for a brief stretch, but doing so \u201cfor any extended period of time was difficult and costly and therefore rarely undertaken.\u201d Id., at 429 (opinion of ALITO, J.). For that reason, \u201csociety\u2019s expectation has been that law enforcement agents and others would not\u2014and indeed, in the main, simply could not\u2014secretly monitor and catalogue every single movement of an individual\u2019scar for a very long period.\u201d Id., at 430. Allowing government access to cell-site records contravenes that expectation. Although such records are generated for commercial purposes, that distinction does not negate Carpenter\u2019s anticipation of privacy in his physical location.<\/p>\n
Mapping a cell phone\u2019s location over the course of 127 days provides an all-encompassing record of the holder\u2019s whereabouts. As with GPS information, the timestamped data provides an intimate window into a person\u2019s life, revealing not only his particular movements, but through them his \u201cfamilial, political, professional, religious, and sexual associations.\u201d Id., at 415 (opinion of SOTOMAYOR, J.). These location records \u201chold for many Americans the \u2018privacies of life.\u2019\u201d Riley, 573 U. S., at ___ (slip op., at 28) (quoting Boyd, 116 U. S., at 630). And like GPS monitoring, cell phone tracking is remarkably easy,cheap, and efficient compared to traditional investigative tools. With just the click of a button, the Government can access each carrier\u2019s deep repository of historical location information at practically no expense.<\/p>\n
In fact, historical cell-site records present even greater privacy concerns than the GPS monitoring of a vehicle we considered in Jones. Unlike the bugged container in Knotts or the car in Jones, a cell phone\u2014almost a \u201cfeature of human anatomy,\u201d Riley, 573 U. S., at ___ (slip op., at 9)\u2014tracks nearly exactly the movements of its owner.While individuals regularly leave their vehicles, they compulsively carry cell phones with them all the time. A cell phone faithfully follows its owner beyond public thoroughfares and into private residences, doctor\u2019s offices,political headquarters, and other potentially revealing locales. See id., at ___ (slip op., at 19) (noting that \u201cnearly three-quarters of smart phone users report being within five feet of their phones most of the time, with 12% admitting that they even use their phones in the shower\u201d); contrast Cardwell v. Lewis, 417 U. S. 583, 590 (1974) (plurality opinion) (\u201cA car has little capacity for escaping public scrutiny.\u201d). Accordingly, when the Government tracks the location of a cell phone it achieves near perfect surveillance, as if it had attached an ankle monitor to the phone\u2019s user.<\/p>\n
Moreover, the retrospective quality of the data here gives police access to a category of information otherwise unknowable. In the past, attempts to reconstruct a person\u2019s movements were limited by a dearth of records and the frailties of recollection. With access to CSLI, the Government can now travel back in time to retrace a person\u2019s whereabouts, subject only to the retention polices of the wireless carriers, which currently maintain records for up to five years. Critically, because location information is continually logged for all of the 400 million devices in the United States\u2014not just those belonging to persons who might happen to come under investigation\u2014this newfound tracking capacity runs against everyone. Unlike with the GPS device in Jones, police need not even know in advance whether they want to follow a particular individual, or when.<\/p>\n
Whoever the suspect turns out to be, he has effectively been tailed every moment of every day for five years, and the police may\u2014in the Government\u2019s view\u2014call upon the results of that surveillance without regard to the constraints of the Fourth Amendment. Only the few without cell phones could escape this tireless and absolute surveillance.<\/p>\n
The Government and JUSTICE KENNEDY contend, however, that the collection of CSLI should be permitted because the data is less precise than GPS information.Not to worry, they maintain, because the location records did \u201cnot on their own suffice to place [Carpenter] at the crime scene\u201d; they placed him within a wedge-shaped sector ranging from one-eighth to four square miles. Brief for United States 24; see post, at 18\u201319. Yet the Court has already rejected the proposition that \u201cinference insulates a search.\u201d Kyllo, 533 U. S., at 36. From the 127 days of location data it received, the Government could, in combination with other information, deduce a detailed log of Carpenter\u2019s movements, including when he was at the siteof the robberies. And the Government thought the CSLI accurate enough to highlight it during the closing argument of his trial. App. 131.<\/p>\n
At any rate, the rule the Court adopts \u201cmust take account of more sophisticated systems that are already inuse or in development.\u201d Kyllo, 533 U. S., at 36. While the records in this case reflect the state of technology at thestart of the decade, the accuracy of CSLI is rapidly approaching GPS-level precision. As the number of cell sites has proliferated, the geographic area covered by each cell sector has shrunk, particularly in urban areas. In addition, with new technology measuring the time and angle ofsignals hitting their towers, wireless carriers already have the capability to pinpoint a phone\u2019s location within 50 meters. Brief for Electronic Frontier Foundation et al. as Amici Curiae 12 (describing triangulation methods that estimate a device\u2019s location inside a given cell sector). Accordingly, when the Government accessed CSLI fromthe wireless carriers, it invaded Carpenter\u2019s reasonable expectation of privacy in the whole of his physical movements.<\/p>\n
The Government\u2019s primary contention to the contrary is that the third-party doctrine governs this case. In its view, cell-site records are fair game because they are\u201cbusiness records\u201d created and maintained by the wireless carriers. The Government (along with JUSTICE KENNEDY)recognizes that this case features new technology, but asserts that the legal question nonetheless turns on a garden-variety request for information from a third-party witness. Brief for United States 32\u201334; post, at 12\u201314. The Government\u2019s position fails to contend with the seismic shifts in digital technology that made possible the tracking of not only Carpenter\u2019s location but also everyone else\u2019s, not for a short period but for years and years.<\/p>\n
Sprint Corporation and its competitors are not your typical witnesses. Unlike the nosy neighbor who keeps an eye on comings and goings, they are ever alert, and their memory is nearly infallible. There is a world of difference between the limited types of personal information addressed in Smith and Miller and the exhaustive chronicle of location information casually collected by wireless carriers today. The Government thus is not asking for a straightforward application of the third-party doctrine, but instead a significant extension of it to a distinct category of information.The third-party doctrine partly stems from the notion that an individual has a reduced expectation of privacy in information knowingly shared with another. But the fact of \u201cdiminished privacy interests does not mean that the Fourth Amendment falls out of the picture entirely.\u201d Riley, 573 U. S., at ___ (slip op., at 16). Smith and Miller, after all, did not rely solely on the act of sharing. Instead, they considered \u201cthe nature of the particular documents sought\u201d to determine whether \u201cthere is a legitimate \u2018expectation of privacy\u2019 concerning their contents.\u201d Miller, 425<\/p>\n
U. S., at 442. Smith pointed out the limited capabilities of a pen register; as explained in Riley, telephone call logs reveal little in the way of \u201cidentifying information.\u201d Smith, 442 U. S., at 742; Riley, 573 U. S., at ___ (slip op., at 24). Miller likewise noted that checks were \u201cnot confidential communications but negotiable instruments to be used in commercial transactions.\u201d 425 U. S., at 442. In mechanically applying the third-party doctrine to this case, the Government fails to appreciate that there are no comparable limitations on the revealing nature of CSLI.<\/p>\n
The Court has in fact already shown special solicitude for location information in the third-party context. In Knotts, the Court relied on Smith to hold that an individual has no reasonable expectation of privacy in public movements that he \u201cvoluntarily conveyed to anyone who wanted to look.\u201d Knotts, 460 U. S., at 281; see id., at 283 (discussing Smith). But when confronted with more pervasive tracking, five Justices agreed that longer term GPS monitoring of even a vehicle traveling on public streets constitutes a search. Jones, 565 U. S., at 430 (ALITO, J., concurring in judgment); id., at 415 (SOTOMAYOR, J., concurring). JUSTICE GORSUCH wonders why \u201csomeone\u2019s location when using a phone\u201d is sensitive, post, at 3, and JUSTICE KENNEDY assumes that a person\u2019s discrete movements \u201care not particularly private,\u201d post, at 17. Yet this case is not about \u201cusing a phone\u201d or a person\u2019s movement at a particular time. It is about a detailed chronicle of a person\u2019s physical presence compiled every day, every moment, over several years.<\/p>\n
Such a chronicle implicates privacy concerns far beyond those considered in Smith and Miller. Neither does the second rationale underlying the third-party doctrine\u2014voluntary exposure\u2014hold up when it comes to CSLI. Cell phone location information is not truly \u201cshared\u201d as one normally understands the term. In the first place, cell phones and the services they provide are \u201csuch a pervasive and insistent part of daily life\u201d that carrying one is indispensable to participation in modern society. Riley, 573 U. S., at ___ (slip op., at 9).<\/p>\n
Second, a cell phone logs a cell-site record by dint of its operation,without any affirmative act on the part of the user beyond powering up. Virtually any activity on the phone generates CSLI, including incoming calls, texts, or e-mails and countless other data connections that a phone automatically makes when checking for news, weather, or social media updates. Apart from disconnecting the phone from the network, there is no way to avoid leaving behind a trail of location data. As a result, in no meaningful sense does the user voluntarily \u201cassume[] the risk\u201d of turning over a comprehensive dossier of his physical movements. Smith, 442 U. S., at 745.<\/p>\n
We therefore decline to extend Smith and Miller to the collection of CSLI. Given the unique nature of cell phone location information, the fact that the Government obtained the information from a third party does not overcome Carpenter\u2019s claim to Fourth Amendment protection. The Government\u2019s acquisition of the cell-site records was a search within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment.<\/p>\n
* * * Our decision today is a narrow one. We do not express a view on matters not before us: real-time CSLI or \u201ctower dumps\u201d (a download of information on all the devices that connected to a particular cell site during a particular interval). We do not disturb the application of Smith and Miller or call into question conventional surveillance techniques and tools, such as security cameras. Nor do we address other business records that might incidentally reveal location information. Further, our opinion does not consider other collection techniques involving foreign affairs or national security. As Justice Frankfurter noted when considering new innovations in airplanes and radios,the Court must tread carefully in such cases, to ensure that we do not \u201cembarrass the future.\u201d Northwest Airlines, Inc. v. Minnesota, 322 U. S. 292, 300 (1944).4
\nIV<\/p>\n
Having found that the acquisition of Carpenter\u2019s CSLI was a search, we also conclude that the Government must generally obtain a warrant supported by probable cause before acquiring such records. Although the \u201cultimate measure of the constitutionality of a governmental search is \u2018reasonableness,\u2019\u201d our cases establish that warrantless searches are typically unreasonable where \u201ca search is undertaken by law enforcement officials to discover evidence of criminal wrongdoing.\u201d Vernonia School Dist. 47J
\nv. Acton, 515 U. S. 646, 652\u2013653 (1995). Thus, \u201c[i]n theabsence of a warrant, a search is reasonable only if it falls within a specific exception to the warrant requirement.\u201d Riley, 573 U. S., at ___ (slip op., at 5).
\nThe Government acquired the cell-site records pursuant to a court order issued under the Stored Communications Act, which required the Government to show \u201creasonable grounds\u201d for believing that the records were \u201crelevant and
\n\u2014\u2014\u2014\u2014\u2014\u2014 4 JUSTICE GORSUCH faults us for not promulgating a complete code addressing the manifold situations that may be presented by this new technology\u2014under a constitutional provision turning on what is \u201creasonable,\u201d no less. Post, at 10\u201312. Like JUSTICE GORSUCH, we \u201cdo not begin to claim all the answers today,\u201d post, at 13, and therefore decide no more than the case before us material to an ongoing investigation.\u201d 18 U. S. C. \u00a72703(d). That showing falls well short of the probable cause required for a warrant. The Court usually requires \u201csome quantum of individualized suspicion\u201d before a search or seizure may take place. United States v. Martinez-Fuerte, 428 U. S. 543, 560\u2013561 (1976). Under the standard in the Stored Communications Act, however, law enforcement need only show that the cell-site evidence might be pertinent to an ongoing investigation\u2014a \u201cgigantic\u201d departure from the probable cause rule, as the Government explained below. App. 34. Consequently, an order issued under Section 2703(d) of the Act is not a permissible mechanism for accessing historical cell-site records. Before compelling a wireless carrier to turn overa subscriber\u2019s CSLI, the Government\u2019s obligation is a familiar one\u2014get a warrant.<\/p>\n
JUSTICE ALITO contends that the warrant requirement simply does not apply when the Government acquiresrecords using compulsory process. Unlike an actual search, he says, subpoenas for documents do not involvethe direct taking of evidence; they are at most a \u201cconstructive search\u201d conducted by the target of the subpoena. Post, at 12. Given this lesser intrusion on personal privacy, JUSTICE ALITO argues that the compulsory production ofrecords is not held to the same probable cause standard.In his view, this Court\u2019s precedents set forth a categorical rule\u2014separate and distinct from the third-party doctrine\u2014subjecting subpoenas to lenient scrutiny without regard to the suspect\u2019s expectation of privacy in the records. Post, at 8\u201319.<\/p>\n
But this Court has never held that the Government may subpoena third parties for records in which the suspect has a reasonable expectation of privacy. Almost all of the examples JUSTICE ALITO cites, see post, at 14\u201315, contemplated requests for evidence implicating diminished privacy interests or for a corporation\u2019s own books.5 The lone exception, of course, is Miller, where the Court\u2019s analysis of the third-party subpoena merged with the application of the third-party doctrine. 425 U. S., at 444 (concluding that Miller lacked the necessary privacy interest to contest the issuance of a subpoena to his bank).<\/p>\n
JUSTICE ALITO overlooks the critical issue. At some point, the dissent should recognize that CSLI is an entirely different species of business record\u2014something that implicates basic Fourth Amendment concerns about arbitrary government power much more directly than corporate tax or payroll ledgers. When confronting new concerns wrought by digital technology, this Court has been careful not to uncritically extend existing precedents. See Riley, 573 U. S., at ___ (slip op., at 10) (\u201cA search of the information on a cell phone bears little resemblance to the type of brief physical search considered [in prior precedents].\u201d).<\/p>\n
If the choice to proceed by subpoena provided a categorical limitation on Fourth Amendment protection, no type of record would ever be protected by the warrant requirement. Under JUSTICE ALITO\u2019s view, private letters, digital contents of a cell phone\u2014any personal information reduced to document form, in fact\u2014may be collected by
\n\u2014\u2014\u2014\u2014\u2014\u2014 5See United States v. Dionisio, 410 U. S. 1, 14 (1973) (\u201cNo person can have a reasonable expectation that others will not know the sound of his voice\u201d); Donovan v. Lone Steer, Inc., 464 U. S. 408, 411, 415 (1984) (payroll and sales records); California Bankers Assn. v. Shultz, 416
\nU. S. 21, 67 (1974) (Bank Secrecy Act reporting requirements); See v. Seattle, 387 U. S. 541, 544 (1967) (financial books and records); United States v. Powell, 379 U. S. 48, 49, 57 (1964) (corporate tax records); McPhaul v. United States, 364 U. S. 372, 374, 382 (1960) (books and records of an organization); United States v. Morton Salt Co., 338 U. S. 632, 634, 651\u2013653 (1950) (Federal Trade Commission reporting requirement); Oklahoma Press Publishing Co. v. Walling, 327 U. S. 186, 189, 204\u2013208 (1946) (payroll records); Hale v. Henkel, 201 U. S. 43, 45, 75 (1906) (corporate books and papers). subpoena for no reason other than \u201cofficial curiosity.\u201d United States v. Morton Salt Co., 338 U. S. 632, 652 (1950). JUSTICE KENNEDY declines to adopt the radical implications of this theory, leaving open the question whether the warrant requirement applies \u201cwhen the Government obtains the modern-day equivalents of an individual\u2019s own \u2018papers\u2019 or \u2018effects,\u2019 even when those papers or effects are held by a third party.\u201d Post, at 13 (citing United States v. Warshak, 631 F. 3d 266, 283\u2013288 (CA6 2010)). That would be a sensible exception, because it would prevent the subpoena doctrine from overcoming any reasonable expectation of privacy. If the third-party doctrine does not apply to the \u201cmodern-day equivalents of an individual\u2019s own \u2018papers\u2019 or \u2018effects,\u2019\u201d then the clear implication is that the documents should receive full Fourth Amendment protection. We simply think that such protection should extend as well to a detailed log of a person\u2019s movements over several years.<\/p>\n
This is certainly not to say that all orders compelling the production of documents will require a showing of probable cause. The Government will be able to use subpoenas to acquire records in the overwhelming majority of investigations. We hold only that a warrant is required in there are case where the suspect has a legitimate privacy interest in records held by a third party.<\/p>\n
Further, even though the Government will generally need a warrant to access CSLI, case-specific exceptionsmay support a warrantless search of an individual\u2019s cell-site records under certain circumstances. \u201cOne well-recognized exception applies when \u2018\u201cthe exigencies of the situation\u201d make the needs of law enforcement so compelling that [a] warrantless search is objectively reasonable under the Fourth Amendment.\u2019\u201d Kentucky v. King, 563
\nU. S. 452, 460 (2011) (quoting Mincey v. Arizona, 437 U. S. 385, 394 (1978)). Such exigencies include the need to pursue a fleeing suspect, protect individuals who are threatened with imminent harm, or prevent the imminent destruction of evidence. 563 U. S., at 460, and n. 3.<\/p>\n
As a result, if law enforcement is confronted with an urgent situation, such fact-specific threats will likely justify the warrantless collection of CSLI. Lower courts, for instance, have approved warrantless searches related to bomb threats, active shootings, and child abductions. Our decision today does not call into doubt warrantless access to CSLI in such circumstances. While police mustget a warrant when collecting CSLI to assist in the mine-run criminal investigation, the rule we set forth does notlimit their ability to respond to an ongoing emergency.
\n* * * As Justice Brandeis explained in his famous dissent, the Court is obligated\u2014as \u201c[s]ubtler and more far-reachingmeans of invading privacy have become available to the Government\u201d\u2014to ensure that the \u201cprogress of science\u201ddoes not erode Fourth Amendment protections. Olmstead
\nv. United States, 277 U. S. 438, 473\u2013474 (1928). Here the progress of science has afforded law enforcement a powerful new tool to carry out its important responsibilities. At the same time, this tool risks Government encroachment of the sort the Framers, \u201cafter consulting the lessons ofhistory,\u201d drafted the Fourth Amendment to prevent. Di Re, 332 U. S., at 595.<\/p>\n
We decline to grant the state unrestricted access to a wireless carrier\u2019s database of physical location information. In light of the deeply revealing nature of CSLI,its depth, breadth, and comprehensive reach, and the inescapable and automatic nature of its collection, the fact that such information is gathered by a third party does not make it any less deserving of Fourth Amendment protection. The Government\u2019s acquisition of the cell-site records here was a search under that Amendment.<\/p>\n
The judgment of the Court of Appeals is reversed, and Opinion of the Court the case is remanded for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.
\nIt is so ordered.<\/p>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"
Washington, DC…Some paragraphs from Roberts’s Opinion…”The Fourth Amendment protects \u201c[t]he right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures.\u201d The \u201cbasic purpose of this Amendment,\u201d our cases have recognized, \u201cis to safeguard the privacy and security of individuals against arbitrary invasions by governmental officials.\u201d Camara […]<\/p>\n","protected":false},"author":1,"featured_media":49166,"comment_status":"open","ping_status":"open","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":{"_cbd_carousel_blocks":"[]","jetpack_post_was_ever_published":false,"_jetpack_newsletter_access":"","_jetpack_dont_email_post_to_subs":false,"_jetpack_newsletter_tier_id":0,"_jetpack_memberships_contains_paywalled_content":false,"_jetpack_memberships_contains_paid_content":false,"footnotes":""},"categories":[20,5,16,4,1],"tags":[],"class_list":["post-61770","post","type-post","status-publish","format-standard","has-post-thumbnail","hentry","category-featured","category-government","category-law-enforcement","category-life-style","category-news","last_archivepost"],"jetpack_featured_media_url":"https:\/\/new.thepinetree.net\/wp-content\/uploads\/2017\/12\/ussupremephoto.jpg","jetpack_sharing_enabled":true,"jetpack-related-posts":[],"_links":{"self":[{"href":"https:\/\/new.thepinetree.net\/index.php?rest_route=\/wp\/v2\/posts\/61770","targetHints":{"allow":["GET"]}}],"collection":[{"href":"https:\/\/new.thepinetree.net\/index.php?rest_route=\/wp\/v2\/posts"}],"about":[{"href":"https:\/\/new.thepinetree.net\/index.php?rest_route=\/wp\/v2\/types\/post"}],"author":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/new.thepinetree.net\/index.php?rest_route=\/wp\/v2\/users\/1"}],"replies":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/new.thepinetree.net\/index.php?rest_route=%2Fwp%2Fv2%2Fcomments&post=61770"}],"version-history":[{"count":0,"href":"https:\/\/new.thepinetree.net\/index.php?rest_route=\/wp\/v2\/posts\/61770\/revisions"}],"wp:featuredmedia":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/new.thepinetree.net\/index.php?rest_route=\/wp\/v2\/media\/49166"}],"wp:attachment":[{"href":"https:\/\/new.thepinetree.net\/index.php?rest_route=%2Fwp%2Fv2%2Fmedia&parent=61770"}],"wp:term":[{"taxonomy":"category","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/new.thepinetree.net\/index.php?rest_route=%2Fwp%2Fv2%2Fcategories&post=61770"},{"taxonomy":"post_tag","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/new.thepinetree.net\/index.php?rest_route=%2Fwp%2Fv2%2Ftags&post=61770"}],"curies":[{"name":"wp","href":"https:\/\/api.w.org\/{rel}","templated":true}]}}